

anvil

a student socialist magazine

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A Symposium —

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LIST

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STALIN ON THE GUILLOTINE

CAREERISM ON THE CAMPUS

CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH

GOD AND THE NEW CRITICISM AT YALE

Spring-Summer 1956

Poetry—Reviews—Student Notes

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Where Anvil Stands...

Anvil and Student Partisan wishes to express the ideas, criticisms and proposals of students who believe in democratic socialism. We address ourselves to those who seek the preservation and extension of democratic values to all forms of political and economic life. We firmly contend that this end must be pursued without deference to the status quo of private property interests, social inequality and human oppression which are characteristic of Western capitalism. At the same time, we are fully aware that totalitarian collectivism (Stalinism), which presently dominates much of the eastern world with its new exploitation and oppression, is the very antithesis of the democratic and equalitarian society which we seek.

We further believe that democracy and socialism are inseparable. Guarantees of democratic rights to all people, without any restrictions, in a society based upon private ownership of the basic means of production and human exploitation, are as impossible as achieving socialism in any society where democratic control is absent from nationalized productive facilities. Socialism cannot exist without democracy. Democracy can only flourish when all human needs are satisfied. Furthermore, a socialist society can only be attained through the conscious thoughtful efforts of a majority of the world's peoples. For this reason we see our task today as an educational and propagandistic one. We seek to encourage a socialist choice as a solution to the power struggle which holds the world in continuous fear and anxiety. This socialist choice must reject both the Western and Stalinist blocs, neither one of which offers hope of democracy, peace and security. Consequently, the socialist choice is a third choice which must embody and express the hopes and desires of the world's peoples in order to triumph.

Anvil and Student Partisan is open to those who desire to critically examine the socialist tradition and to reevaluate those aspects of it which are no longer applicable. But as our name implies, we claim no impartiality on the major social questions of our time, nor the forces behind them. We will defend colonial movements struggling for freedom from foreign domination and at the same time we will extend our hand to those behind the iron curtain who seek to overthrow their oppressive masters. We will seek to create sympathy for the aspirations of working class movements throughout the world. And we will support the struggles of the American labor movement for a larger share in that better life of which socialism is the final consummation.

The business manager speaks...

Dear Reader,

We received many letters of praise in response to the Winter '56 issue of ANVIL—even one from far off Australia—and they were certainly appreciated. But, as usual in business columns, we are going to ask for even more from our readers.

ANVIL is the *only* student socialist magazine in the U.S. today. We feel that it is an important weapon in breaking the freeze of conformity on campus by creating a student movement that will fight against war and oppression and for a better society. Thus everyone who in general feels the same need should help us circulate ANVIL as widely as possible. Here are our suggestions on how this can be done.

First and foremost, subscribe to the

magazine yourself. A subscription costs \$1.00 for 5 issues and can be obtained by writing to our office at 36 E. 10th St., N. Y. 3, N. Y.

Second, get your friends to subscribe.

Third, take a bundle. 5 or more copies are available at 20 cents a copy. Try and get it on the newsstands and in the bookstores, sell it on the campus, get your student organizations to circulate the magazine, get a review in your school paper, etc.

And finally, if you cannot do these things personally, drop me a line about clubs, libraries, campus newspapers, etc., that should receive the magazine.

Fraternally,

MEL BECKER

What Do You Think?

Your letters of criticism or support are welcome. They will help us to publish a more effective magazine. Please note whether part or all of your letter may be published in *Anvil*.

AMONG THE ARTICLES AND CONTRIBUTORS IN THE NEXT ISSUE:

Marxism and Social Science, by Don Thomas

Balzac and his Time, by Mike Harrington

The 1956 Elections: The Decline of American Democracy

Jim Crow Grows Old

— Negro-White Labor Unity vs. Racism

ANY DISCUSSION of the struggle for Negro rights today must begin with a paradox: in almost every area of American life during the past decade, conservatism has been growing, the people have not been in motion; but that in this one area of civil rights, we encounter a militant, even radical, movement embracing almost all sections of the Negro population.

This paradox is not an academic puzzle—it marks a very real struggle that is taking place today in American society. Politicians who are the product of the growing conservative mood are attempting to impress their moderation upon this Negro militancy, to bring this radical consciousness into conformity with the rest of America. They speak in lofty generalizations—some of them, like Adlai Stevenson have even been compared to Lincoln—but the practical, political import of their philosophizing is everywhere the same: to slow down, to retard, to channel, the vast movement for civil rights.

In order to understand what is happening, and especially so that the various historical metaphors can be placed in perspective, it is necessary to understand the present situation in civil rights in terms of its historical context. Why, for example, does this paradox of conservatism and militancy exist? What led to it? What is the basis for the tremendous surge of Negro consciousness? Only when these fundamental questions are answered can we come to grips with the immediate political reality of the problem.

And when we do come to the politics of civil rights, approaching it in this historical perspective, we should be able to see through all this talk of moderation. We shall see it as an attempt to brake a massive social movement with roots in the changing economy of the South, the Cold War, in the sixty year process of Negro struggle.

The Historical Roots of Racism

Ideologies are not disembodied ghosts without relationship to the material world. They have periods of growth and of decay which are related, in the final analysis, to changes within the social world. They arise under certain specific historical circumstances, grow and disappear in accordance with basic alterations in the social-structure.

And racism in the United States is no exception to this. Racism was developed in the eighteen-thirties, forties, and fifties as the ideological buttress for slavery. While there had always been racist overtones to the slave system, it was only as the crisis of the South heightened in the decades before the Civil War that a coherent and internally consistent racist ideology was consciously erected.

With defeat of the Southern slave-owning aristocracy and the abolition of human bondage, a noticeable decline in the power of racism in the American South occurred. While at no time was the Negro in the South fully accepted as an equal in all respects, nevertheless a system of legalized Jim Crow institutions did not become common until the beginning of the twentieth century. In the thirty years or so after the end of the Civil War, Negroes were free to vote throughout the South. Twenty-two Negroes represented the South in Congress. A Negro was Senator from Mississippi in the eighteen-

seventies and early eighteen-eighties, Negroes served on juries, held county and state offices, and participated in the political life of the Democratic, Republican, and Populist parties. Black and white poor farmers fought together in the Populist movement for their mutual benefit, black and white workers jointly participated in trade-union struggles.

In the eighteen-nineties all this changed. A series of Jim-Crow constitutions were written in the Southern states which effectively denied the ballot to the Negro, and paved the way for the passage of laws prohibiting intermingling of the races in every area of life, from education and transportation to public golf courses. While this was the product of a complex of social, economic, and political factors, two stand out as decisive.

First, the emergence of the United States as an imperialist power with the Spanish-American war destroyed the opposition of northern liberals to racism, for if they were to "Take Up the White Man's Burden" and offer a racist defense of American domination of the Philippines, they could no longer attack Southern Jim Crow.

In the second place, and most significantly, the solidifying of the South's quasi-colonial relationship to the North in the two decades after the Redemption of 1877 created an environment in which racism could grow. The South never was allowed to develop its own industrial potential.

The dominant Northern capitalism relegated the South to a quasi-colonial status: the raw material producing area for Northern industry. Southern railroads belonged to Northern control of finance and banking and high tariffs kept the price of industrial goods the South had to buy at artificially high levels.

Under these circumstances, the great mass of Southerners, white and black, were kept in poverty and in a state of cultural backwardness.

The Populist movement in the South represented an attempt to fight against the impacts of this system. When its opponents could not defeat it in any other way, they exploited the latent racism of the white agricultural masses in order to split the Populist movement. The combination of the poverty of a colonial people, the consequent stagnation and the failure of the Populist movement paved the way for a racist campaign which resulted in the Jim-Crow constitutions of the eighteen-nineties and the raising of legalized segregation laws.

The End of Rural Idiocy

In the past decade this exploited economic position of the South has begun to change and with it has come the necessary social conditions for a successful struggle against Jim-Crow. Industrialization is raising the cultural level of the Southern masses, destroying that idiocy of rural life observed by such divergent writers as Karl Marx and William Faulkner, and will tend in the long-run to break down the barriers between black and white workers who will work and struggle side by side. The very cost of segregated institutions is increasingly

felt to be an unnecessary burden upon the economy of the South, a burden which must be destroyed in the process of the rationalization of society which industrialization brings with it.

This is not to deny, of course, that in the short run the new capitalism in the South has not been an unmixed blessing. For while the long-range progressive changes are apparent to any careful observer and while the new organized labor movement that has arisen is playing, in a somewhat hesitant fashion, an important role in the fight against racism, Southern industry has been attempting to split black and white workers by increasing racial hatred. But this contradiction can only be resolved in one way. In the final analysis Southern capitalism will be faced with a united working class raised by the new conditions of life to a level of consciousness which will make impossible the successful use of the divisive racist tactics of the past.

The entire process brought into being by the changing Southern economic status has been accelerated by the ideological and military demands of the cold-war. The anti-colonial struggle of the non-white peoples of Asia and Africa against European imperialism dominates our era. In such a world American Jim-Crow institutions are an explosive matter. Every flagrant incident of the oppression of American Negroes becomes front-page material in every newspaper from India to the Gold Coast.

The Demands of the Cold War

In order to meet this threat, the United States government has made certain limited moves to outlaw certain Jim Crow practices. Thus the Eisenhower Administration supported the NAACP in the Supreme Court cases which resulted in the integration decision. The Truman Administration recognized these demands of the cold-war in 1948 when its Committee on Civil Rights declared:

We cannot escape the fact that our civil rights record has been an issue in world politics. . . . The United States is not so strong, the final triumph of the democratic ideal is not so inevitable that we can ignore what the world thinks of us or our record.

Furthermore, the military needs of the United States have accelerated the breakdown of the Jim Crow system. Therefore, in the same fashion as the production needs of World War II brought about the partial acceptance of Negroes into industry, the Korean War brought integration of the armed forces.

Thus, possibilities for a heightened struggle for Negro rights have been created. And the Negro people have pushed these far beyond the level anticipated or immediately desired even by most white liberals and the northern N.A.A.C.P. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People has declared that its slogan is "Free by '68" and challenging the stereotyped image of the docile and passive Negro conjured up by decades of Southern apologists.

This is the setting in which political evaluation of the fight for Negro emancipation must take place and it is in this context that we must judge the orientation of various political tendencies toward this struggle.

Adlai Stevenson has dramatized the schizophrenic character of the Democratic Party in relation to this issue. He has attempted to obscure the basic split in the Democratic Party by philosophic references to "moderation," by conjuring up an image of civil war—and by comparing his own position to that of Lincoln. This last image is an instructive one, for by giving it even the most superficial attention, Stevenson's role—the role of the Democratic Party—becomes quite plain.

In 1860, Abraham Lincoln was the leader of a new minority party which had won an election because of a split in Democratic ranks which had come about through sectional conflict. This new party was a revolutionary force in American life, the expression of a rising and aggressive industrial bourgeoisie seeking to accomplish a major social transformation of American society. The Southern plantation aristocracy stood in the way of this change, and the Civil War was the resolution of the conflict. The victory of the North did not simply mean the triumph of one section of the nation against another—it signified the hegemony of a social system, capitalism, in America.

The South entered this struggle with considerable strength. Its ruling class was unified, unthreatened by serious internal dangers. It was strong enough to organize a massive military struggle, make alliances with European states, and keep the North at bay during the four years of conflict.

Contrast 1960, and Lincoln's dilemma, with 1956 and Democratic equivocation. A man like Stevenson is the titular head of a party with a divided soul: the Northern urban machines and the Southern Democracy as against a labor movement which is uneasy in the alliance and potentially detachable from it. Instead of attempting to effect a social transformation of American society—like Lincoln's Republican Party—the Democratic Party is trying to keep together an antagonistic alliance by compromise on basic program.

In 1952, Stevenson had the minimal virtue of having the support of the left wing of this unstable coalition; i.e., of the liberal-labor forces within the Democratic Party. In the following years, however, he intensified his courtship of the Southern Democracy and emerged as the spokesman of the center-right. This shift symbolized the growing impotence of the liberal-labor elements in the Party, it was tantamount to a desertion of their basic premise that the Party could be transformed from within without losing the Southerners. In this sense, Stevenson's personal role has become particularly reactionary, reactionary within the context of a party whose composition inhibits it from any real progressive action.

Thus, while Lincoln declared that a house divided against itself could not long endure, Stevenson is precisely the leader who attempts to keep the divided house of the Democratic Party together. While he declares with one breath that he is for enforcement of the Supreme Court decision, he attempts to lessen the guilt of the South by pointing at Northern discrimination, a classic maneuver from the times of John C. Calhoun. Indeed, at one point, Stevenson even managed to stand to the right of that doughty moderate, Dwight Eisenhower, by declaring that a separate commission on minorities and the ballot was not necessary, that the Justice Department could handle the situation under existing laws.

The Safety Pin of the Democratic Party

Stevenson, the man, is not important to this analysis. What is important is that it be understood that he symbolizes the fundamentally reactionary equivocation which the Democratic Party must make with regard to the struggle for Negro emancipation. That he now represents an unstable coalition right and center, the Democratic Party is basically unable to carry out a progressive program on civil rights. The comparison with Lincoln Republicanism is indeed instructive: it is the contrast between a Party bent on radical transformation and the creation of a new social system, and a Party based upon a hodge-podge alliance of reactionary status quo and of the Party's right and center is not the crucial point. Left, progressive elements.

But what of the specter of Civil War? At the very outset, it should be plain that there are explosive aspects to the Southern resistance to integration. Moreover, any policy which would seek violence, and which would initiate it, is not only terribly wrong, but is unnecessary as well. There is a way to integration, a persistent, continuous way of social movement, which need not raise the possibility of widespread violence, much less of civil war. To understand this, it is necessary to return to a basic historical analysis of the situation.

The White Citizens Councils are not the Southern ruling class of 1960. On the one side, they are menaced by Southerners who do accept the Supreme Court ruling—the students at Alabama who rallied to Autherine Lucy's admission, for example. On the other side, they have a radical right wing based upon a rural lumpen proletariat of the kind which Huey Long led in the thirties. But in the main, the bulk of the Citizens Councils are not talking in terms of civil war, or even of mob violence. They are resisting, but their very propaganda betrays their own knowledge that their cause is lost. As a whole, the Citizens Councils represent the final struggle of a doomed *status quo*, they are an anachronism in Twentieth century America in conflict with a social reality which is overpowering.

But there is a factor which can increase the power of the Citizens Councils: *the belief that the Federal Government will not enforce the decisions of the Supreme Court.* Their primary source of strength is the weakness of their enemies. They can become a threat, and this is especially true of their right wing, only if no progressive solution to the problems, which gave rise to them, is forthcoming.

The Abettors of Violence Cry Moderation

At the same time, this is not to formulate a program of pushing integration through as though no opposition existed. The customs and traditions of decades are being over-turned, and there is resistance. In such a situation, there is certainly room for tactical maneuvering in a given instance. But in general, the opposition to the White Citizens' Councils is simply not as formidable as is conjured in the images of certain Northern liberals. Our general attitude must be one of steady struggle for integration—it is precisely the opposite policy which is the greatest boon to the Southern racists.

Two side points should be raised here. The first is the illuminating contrast between the attitude of use of troops in a strike situation and in a case like that of Autherine Lucy. At Perfect Circle in Indiana, at Sperry in New York, and Westinghouse in Pittsburgh, the bourgeoisie has demonstrated that it can cope effectively with mass picketing through the use of militia and arrest. But when a Lucy incident comes up on the horizon, there is a sudden development of introspection on the question of violence. This is not necessarily to advocate the intervention of Federal troops in the South. It is simply to point out that similar situations can be handled, without great violence, by the determined use of society's coercive instruments in the interests of reactionary strikebreaking attempts. To put it another way: are the constitutional rights of the American Negro on a par with the rights of private property?

The second side-point is even more important. In his approach to the problem, Stevenson has counseled moderation (echoing Eisenhower). He is, it seems, opposed to the extremists on both sides, as are most liberals. The right-wing extremists are easily identifiable: the Citizens' Councils. But who are the extremists on the Negro side? Is this a reference to the NAACP which has been going through the courts with all

the persistence of a tortoise these many years? Is this a description of the Montgomery bus boycott movement whose demands simply call for *the same pattern of segregation in Montgomery as in the rest of the South?* The whole problem was well summarized in an exchange which recently appeared in *Life* magazine. William Faulkner had written an article calling for the Negro to "Stop Now For a Moment." A letter answered him:

Mr. Faulkner's ancestors owned slaves. My ancestors were slaves. He advises: "Stop now for a moment." For how long a moment? The Negro, the Northerner, the Southerner such as Mr. Faulkner, and the world at large have been patiently waiting for a "moment" which has now lasted more than 90 years.

The "moment" has lasted for 90 years; but now the time has come for the long wait to end. The South is being revolutionized in fact by urbanization and industrialization; by the end of its colonial status within the American economy. More, it has become an issue in the Cold War, the eyes of the world are quite literally upon Montgomery, Alabama. This massive movement of economic change, accelerated by cold war stratagems, has brought the movement to ripeness.

In such a situation, there is only one policy open to us: to push as hard as possible for integration. This does not mean civil war, or carpet-bagging, or violence. It does mean a strong, determined struggle to take advantage of what is happening. In doing this, we do not propose to impose a utopian policy upon a society from the outside. We are calling for all those committed to Negro emancipation to seize an opportunity which is there—clearly and palpably there. In this sense, Stevenson, or any one else who drags up unhistorical analogies to the Lincoln period, plays a reactionary role.

But more important than the single voice of Stevenson, or the frightened voices of liberalism, is the crisis in the Democratic Party. Since 1938, the American legislature has been ruled by a coalition of Southern Democrats and Republicans: the Dixie-GOP has been the actual congressional power in the land. During this rule, there has not been one single piece of new progressive social legislation. And the factor which has contributed most to this persistence of the status quo is, undeniably, the Democratic Party. More than any other political institution in our society, it stands in the way of democratic change. Tragically, this reactionary Party has secured the allegiance of the most progressive sectors of the population, of the labor and liberal movement, of the Negroes—and it now stands at a dead end.

The question of civil rights has raised the issue of the Democratic Party in particularly sharp form. Those within the Party, those very few, who do not equivocate, are powerless. Control belongs to those who accept the compromise, who are willing to jettison all program and principles in order to keep the electoral machine going.

Between 1952 and 1956, Adlai Stevenson moved from representing the powerless liberal-labor left to the compromised center-right. From either position, he is unable to take a decent stand on the fight for Negro rights. The importance of his individual pergrination lies in the fact that it reveals the Democratic Party for what it is: a road-block to progressive political action, not only in the area of civil rights, but in labor, housing, and other areas as well.

We believe that the struggle in the South cannot proceed on one level, that of court action, or even be limited to the magnificent direct action of the bus boycott in Montgomery. It must have national political expression. Clearly, what this

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The Middle Eastern Crisis

—Only a Third Camp Solution Possible

The Middle East stands on the brink of war today as the complex Israeli-Arab rivalry is being fanned by an armament race. There is no simple and ready made solution for this crisis. There are no simple questions of right and wrong.

For Israel the question of war is a question of its very survival. If nothing else is sure one thing is—the “victory” of Israel in 1948 will not and cannot be repeated in 1956. The Arab states, led by Egypt, are stronger today than ever before. Israel, on the other hand, torn by its isolation and weakened by the strain of a war-economy, is in danger of being destroyed by the “second round.” The Jews of Israel have been gathered together as if only to await the slaughterer. The Zionist promise with its deep chauvinism, its disregard of the Arab peoples, and its dependence on the imperialist powers of the world for support, has led the Jews of Israel into a trap from which there is no escape—except through the abandonment of the policies of Zionism.

If there is a solution to this political and human crisis, it lies in the direction of a program directed to the Arab peoples and not to their corrupt rulers. Equality for the Arabs inside and outside of Israel is the first step within the context of an entirely new Israel policy. That policy necessarily means a change in Israel's activities not only in the immediate situation but also in its relationship to the two imperialist camps.

One of the most important facts about the Middle East crisis is that both the U.S. and Russia are directly involved. If ever there was confirmation of the Third Camp Socialist's contention that there is no real choice between the rival camps for the peoples of the world who desire peace and democracy, then the activities of the U.S. State Department in the Middle East and of the Russians should once and for all demonstrate the absolute hopelessness of a policy which depends upon them.

Arms and American Duplicity

In the most recent demonstration of this, Secretary of State Dulles castigated the Russians for stirring up trouble in the Middle East. The hypocrisy of the American government was exposed when the N. Y. *Post* revealed that American tanks were being shipped to Saudi-Arabia. They were sitting on the docks in Brooklyn waiting to be shipped—but “everyone” said that they didn't know a thing about it. In the flurry of excitement over the exposure, the State Department prohibited the shipment. In a day or two, the ban was lifted because the State Department could find nothing “illegal” about shipping these tanks.

Now, apparently, another shift in American Middle Eastern policy has taken place. Israel is to be armed after all. That is, Britain and France are to be allowed to sell Israel arms. It is the old game of jockeying for position that the American government is playing. Russia, making its bid for power and influence in the Middle East, plays the game with the United States. In between is Israel and the Arab peoples. They cannot win. At best there can be a continued stalemate between the Israelis and the Arabs. At worst a war—and the almost inevitable ruin of Israel if the war is fought out to a conclusion. The fact that an armaments race is no solution should be clear to everyone except—the reactionary rulers of the Arab

nations for whom war would be a solution of the “Jewish question” and the leaders of the Israel government who follow a blind policy of arms, more arms and yet more arms.

To repeat: a solution of the crisis lies in a basic change in the Israel policy. Why Israel? Because in Israel there exists a modern, educated working class which can take the initiative in a progressive policy which would necessarily embrace the whole of the Middle East.

Several things must first be understood and accepted by the Israelis. First, Israel is one of the Middle East states and *not* some special fulfillment of a Zionist conception. Israel cannot be a ghetto. Second, Israel must be binational. Arabs must have full rights and must be encouraged to participate as full citizens of Israel. Third, it is necessary that the relationship of Israel to the Arab states be a revolutionary one. The present reactionary leaders cannot be appeased—it is meaningless to enter into “agreements” with men whose very political existence in most cases depends on keeping the masses of their countries inflamed against Israel. It is to the masses of these countries that the progressive forces of Israel must orientate. The Arab masses are in motion; the Arab ruling classes are near desperation. The undoubted anti-Israel sentiment of these masses could change over-night if the policy of the Israelis toward these same people would change.

A Concrete Policy Proposed

To be more concrete: Israel must give full rights to all of its Arabs citizens and must end actual discrimination. They must compensate the Arab peasants for their seized land—if not return it. 2. All civil rights must be returned to the Arab citizens. 3. Arabs must be actively encouraged to enter into the life of Israel. 4. Outside of Israel, the Israel government must admit 100,000 Arab refugees as it once proposed to do and accept the principle of repatriation for all legitimate refugees.

The Jewish fund-raising organizations which have provided many millions of dollars for Israel should raise funds for the resettlement of the Arab refugees.

This act, in itself, would do more than all of the arms toward making a war improbable. This means one thing—that Israel must launch a political offensive *against* the Arab rulers and for the support of the Arab peoples. Israel must show the Arab peoples that its advanced technology and economy represents progress in the Middle East—for both Jews and Arabs.

In regard to the roles of Russia and the United States, what we have said is self evident. Attachment to the political kite of the U.S. State Department means that Israel will be forever at the mercy of the whims of power and oil. The ugly intentions of Russia are perfectly plain. Arms to the dictator Nasser is only the most recent illustration.

This solution to the Middle Eastern Crisis is not an easy one. But it is the only real one for those who desire a democratic and peaceful answer. The effectiveness of the Third Camp position can be demonstrated in this crisis. The bankruptcy of the apologists and hangers-on of Russian or American imperialism has already been shown.

A. L.

Stalinism Without Stalin

— The 20th Party Congress

THE POSTHUMOUS dethronement of Stalin at the 20th Congress of the Russian Communist Party has produced a state of shock throughout the world. Newspaper editorialists and columnists, radio commentators, Russian "experts," scholars—all, without exception, testify to their surprise and amazement. The nervous systems of the various Communist Parties register the shock in a particularly explosive fashion, as the Stalinists prepare for the prospect of taking back so much of what they yesterday defended vehemently. We learn of repercussions inside Russia too, and there are many more in that oppressed country of which we do not learn, we can be sure. All in all, the violent effects of the repudiation of Stalin equal, if they do not surpass, the reactions produced in 1939 by the Hitler-Stalin Pact.

And how could it be otherwise? For over twenty-five years all of the propaganda agencies of the Russian regime and the international Stalinist movement vigorously cultivated the "Stalin myth." Stalin was depicted as the man who had saved Russia from defeat by the Nazis; as the man who almost single-handedly had secured what the new ruling class of bureaucrats deceptively describes as "the final and irrevocable triumph of socialism," and so on. To get a taste of the Byzantine adulation of Stalin, it is only necessary to recall a few of the more choice bits of praise heaped upon the Vozhd, but these will provide only a taste; it would require pages to set forth the full flavor of the flattery with which he was showered by those who today figuratively spit upon his image:

"Long live the towering genius of all humanity," cried Molotov not too long after the Leader had consummated his "diplomatic brilliance" by achieving an alliance with Hitler.

"The genius of Stalin, his iron will in the last year, secured the defeat of the enemy," said Bulganin.

"Great military leader and organizer of victory, you, comrade Stalin, created modern Soviet military science. Oh great chorus leader of science, your classical works are the greatest possession of humanity," chanted the Russian Council of Ministers and the Central Committee of the Russian CP on the occasion of Stalin's seventieth birthday.

"It would be hard to name a branch of science, culture or art, or a sector of the ideological front, where the inspiring and directing role of our great leader and teacher and the beneficial influence of his brilliant ideas has not been felt," declared Suslov, a few months before Stalin's death.

And today these co-workers and co-assassins of Stalin vie with each other in denouncing him, in repudiating his "excesses," in decrying his stature. Today they inform a shocked world that he committed many military blunders which almost cost Russia its victory in the last war, that he had rewritten and falsified history, that he had made many ideological errors, killed innocent people, terrorized his close associates, and had been a "madman."

Why have Stalin's heirs, those who rule and exploit Russia today, embarked on this course? That it was not a light-minded decision can be taken for granted, considering the risks which that decision entails. These risks range from the possibility of wide-spread demoralization among the members

and supporters of the Communist Parties throughout the world to what, from the viewpoint of the Russian bureaucracy is even more serious—the possibility of profound upheavals in Russia itself. And yet the decision to gamble was taken.

The explanation for this development is to be found in the course of events which has taken place in Russia since Stalin's death. But before these are examined it is necessary to take a look at the thesis which claims that the Russian rulers are introducing democracy in Russia and that their denunciation of Stalin is a first step along such a road. This view, propagated by people like Isaac Deutcher, will undoubtedly be accepted as good currency by all of those who are prone to illusions about Stalinism, and by some who hitherto have not been subject to them.

This idea does not survive even a superficial analysis of what has taken place nor a cursory thinking-through of the assumptions which underlie it. The basic fallacy which underpins the claim of "democratization" consists of the notion that any relaxation of terror (and all despotisms oscillate in respect to the degree of terror which they apply against the people) is a step towards democracy, as if every act of repression, every murder, every totalitarian restriction, were needed for the characterization of Russia as totalitarian. Much, for example, is made of the easing in recent years of the vise in which Russian culture had been clamped. But the late Stalin's late partner Hitler, had never introduced the degree of state supervision of literature and art which has obtained in Russia. Logic would therefore require from those who are prey to illusions about Stalinism the view that Nazism from the beginning contained a step towards its self-democratization. Or, to take another example, fascist Spain has less political repression today than it did in the years immediately following the Civil War. And yet not even the defenders of America's alliance with the Franco tyranny claim that Franco is introducing democracy.

Not Even One Step Forward

Not a single, tiny act has been undertaken by Krushchev and Company towards the *essential* ingredient of a "step towards democracy": the right to oppose the regime and its policies. Not a *single* step has been taken towards establishing free speech, a free press, the right to organize political parties and organizations, the right to organize unions, the right to strike. Only when the Russian workers overthrow Krushchev and the bureaucrats who rule over them, will such steps be taken—only then they will not be "steps," but rather leaps.

The Twentieth Congress itself presents unambiguous proof of the character of the changes which have occurred. The castigation of Stalin was as unanimously approved as the reports lauding him had been in bygone years. Not a single delegate voted "no," or even spoke in opposition to the line of Krushchev. The regime did not even bother to create a fake atmosphere of opposition by staging a scene in which a delegate or two "criticized" the leadership.

The reaction of the Kremlin regime to the "pro-Stalin" sentiment expressed in Georgia poses another irrefutable blow to the victims of the "democratization" illusion. The reports

on the events in Tiflis have been too fragmentary for conclusions on the meaning of those demonstrations, although enough is known to both cast doubt on the assumption that they were an expression of hostility to the repudiation of Stalin, and to suggest that one of their basic motivations consisted of a fear that the new events would result in national oppression of the Georgian people, a fact which reveals much about Russian society. But "pro-Stalin" or not, the reactions of the bureaucracy were: purge, suppression, closing of the university—i.e., the reactions of the "madman" Stalin.

And within the last few days *Pravda* has published statements informing the Russian people that the attack on the Stalin cult must not be understood by anybody to imply the right to free expression of criticism. "The party cannot permit that the freedom to discuss problems should be taken as a freedom to propagandize views alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism (sic) . . . or directed against the party's policy," it warned the "rotten elements" in the party, i.e., those who may for a moment have had the hope that a "step towards democracy" was actually being made.

What is taking place in Russia is a sloughing off of the excesses of Stalin's rule, a process which was begun not too long after his death and which has now, with the repudiation of Stalin himself, undergone a sharp acceleration. Those excesses which Stalin's "madness," i.e., his personal sadism, cruelty and need for revenge occasioned and which are excesses from the view of the "normal" operation of the totalitarian bureaucratic-collectivist system, or which while needed in the thirties are no longer required for *that* system today, are being cast off. But this is being done within the framework of the totalitarian system; *it remains*.

Totalitarianism Leads to One-Man Rule

The explanation for the repudiation of the "cult of personality," that is, for the shift from crediting the personality of Stalin with all "achievements" to blaming the personality of Stalin for evils and errors, cannot be found in any "democratization," but is locatable, rather, in the needs of the bureaucratic ruling class itself, as well as in the relation of forces between that class and the oppressed classes in Russia, the working class in the first place. What must not be forgotten is that while the bureaucracy requires totalitarianism for its rule and while totalitarianism always tends in the direction of the kind of one-man political rule exercised by Stalin, these very same bureaucrats frequently find that rule and the "excesses" it produces burdensome, to put it mildly. The Russian ruling class has worked hard, has had to live under the shadow of terror, has faced purge, etc. And now that it has achieved the vast industrialization of Russia, and has increased its power and wealth; and after coming through a war which took its toll; it wishes to relax and to be able to enjoy its power and privileges. It desired to lessen the war danger, and thus the "co-existence" line emerged several years ago; it wanted to ease up the tenseness existing in the country, and hence certain concessions, both a few real ones and a lot of fake ones, were made in the last few years. And now it wishes to rid itself of that threat which "one-man" rule represents for it, and so, the attack on Stalin.

To this factor must be added one other, the constant pressure of the class struggle waged by the Russian workers. The lower and middle levels of the bureaucracy, as distinguished from its summits, feel this pressure most keenly; together with its own desire for a relaxation, this undoubtedly played a role in its thinking, and accounts for the few concessions to the workers, in the form of a promise of shorter hours

next year, which accompany the attack on Stalin. The dethronement of the late dictator—alas, that he did not live to see it—will have a favorable effect for the Kremlin's international line of "Popular Front" and this too must have entered into the thinking of the Stalinist leadership, even if it only played a minor role in that international line. This, like the denial of Stalin, is a product of the primary causes of these developments, the need of the bureaucracy for relaxation, and the pressure of the class struggle.

And finally, there is the not unimportant factor of struggle within the bureaucracy itself, struggle between individual bureaucrats and between cliques and tendencies of the bureaucracy. It is around this aspect that most of the cogitation and speculation—largely nonsensical—of the Russian "experts" has taken place. Unlike such "experts" we have no inside knowledge of who is fighting whom, but that such struggle does take place and that it plays a minor role as auxiliary to and reflection of the basic social factors, is certain. Thus one possible element in the repudiation of Stalin at this time may have been that sections of the bureaucracy fear that one or more leading bureaucrats are grooming themselves for Stalin's old role.

Possibility for Revolutionary Struggle

The new dictators are not granting democracy, nor will they grant it. But their recent actions reflect the yearnings and struggles of the Russian people for it. Moreover, it opens up possibilities for renewed and reinvigorated effort by the masses in Russia to rid themselves of the oppression that tyrannizes over them. Evidence that such a result, which will be supported by all democrats everywhere, has already been produced exists even in these first few weeks after the Twentieth Party Congress. Along the lines of the Tiflis demonstrators, and those whom *Pravda* calls "rotten elements," will the destruction of totalitarianism in Russia take place, not along the lines of "faith" in the ability or desire of the bureaucrats to grant democracy.

In addition to opening up roads for strong action by the Russian people, the recent events in Moscow create the possibility for striking a blow against the reactionary stranglehold which Stalinism has on much of the international working class. Even here in the United States, where the Communist Party is as small and discredited as it is, the turbulence and doubts have been great, and the CP has been forced to open some kind of discussion in its ranks and public press. What is necessary is that sincere and honest supporters of Stalinism, those who give it allegiance because they sincerely believe Russia to be a "socialist society" and the Communist Party an authentic "working class movement," raise the questions about all that troubles them. Doesn't the repudiation of Stalin, and all that it entails, raise severe doubts about the justification of the Hitler-Stalin Pact, all of the Moscow Trials and purges—and not merely the murder of Tuchachevsky.

Above all else the American supporters of the CP must face up to the contradiction between the view of Stalin's rule which is now being presented to them and the idea that Russia is "socialist." If they face this question honestly they will find that the answer to the "contradiction" lies in the falseness of one of the premises. There was not under Stalin and is not under Krushchev any "socialism," but rather its polar opposite, totalitarian, exploitative class-society.

MAX MARTIN

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Careerism on the Campus

—Two Faces of Conformity

WHEN THE RADICAL STUDENT approaches the contemporary campus scene one of the more frustrating problems he faces is not the antagonism with which his ideas are met, but that they are usually not met at all. The campus in the past five years has become the most stolid, frightened and conforming arena on the American scene. There is a deep, underlying antipathy toward what was once known as the political world and the political man, no matter what his particular brand of politics might be. In general, the student today is unalterably opposed to expressing his own ideas too vociferously on anything, unless they be ideas about which no one can get excited, i.e., ideas which have no value or moral content. He is interested in his school work, and willing to talk about it, but only if he feels assured beforehand that he will not be expected to connect his ideas with significant action. The expression of emotion repels and disturbs him. It brings to mind a whole approach to the world and a style of living which he has consciously or unconsciously rejected.

Few of the older generation know this generation; most still talk of "youth" with that old assurance that it is a time of rebellion and re-evaluation. The ex-radicals of the 1930's prate about their rediscovery of America and their maturation. But it is all irrelevant in the terms of their younger counterparts. While the ex-radicals examine the extent of "alienation" necessary for the "creative" person, splitting hairs and redefining terms, the younger generation remains deaf and dumb to the whole problem. If we today are not alienated in the sense that the radicals of the 1930's were—alienated from middle class mores and manners—we are alienated in a far more tragic and encompassing sense. We are alienated from ourselves, at least from ourselves as creative human beings.

The Alienated Generation

Marx defined the alienated man as one compelled "to labor at something which neither expresses nor sustains his own needs and interests." The unalienated man is the creative man—"anyone who, under an inner compulsion, is doing significant work, wrestling with a problem, or striving to articulate a vision." The contemporary young intellectuals are almost universally in these terms among the alienated.

The symptoms are numerous. Irving Howe and Lewis Coser, and George Rawick also, have noted one outstanding example in two perceptive articles in *Dissent*. They examine the new type of Stalinoid. A half-generation ago you could reach the apologist for Russian totalitarianism if you could convince him that slave labor existed, that the Moscow purge trials were a farce, or that the rulers of the new Russian society permitted no democracy. But today such arguments meet with a new response; no denial, but "so what" followed by a series of clever and sophisticated arguments about historical necessity and "progress." Here are individuals concerned with ideas, even unpopular in many ways. But they are ideas devoid of a personal commitment. Their proponents do not intend to "fight" for their ideas—merely to play with them. And they are precisely ideas meant to be toyed with. For to fight, die, sacrifice, or struggle for the sake of such amoral abstractions is a phenomenon only for the mentally sick.

Or take as an example the reaction of most college students

to the most striking hypocrisies, lunacies, and brutalities of our day. Even the East German uprising of June 1953, which aroused considerable furor among those of the older generation, produced no impact upon ours, stirred few, excited almost none. "Political irritability" perhaps, but drive, never.

The Rearguarders

College students are part of the new middle class (professionals, bureaucrats, managers, etc.)—notes sociologist C. Wright Mills in his now famous *White Collar*—the "rear-guarders," waiting for someone else to move. As a group they have no cohesion, but are on sale to the highest bidder or the most likely winner. "They have no steady discontent or responsible struggle with the conditions of their lives. For discontent of this sort requires imagination, even a little vision; responsible struggle requires leadership."

As individuals with private positions, continues Mills, "they hesitate, confused and vacillating in their opinions, unfocused and discontinuous in their actions . . . they have no targets on which to focus their worry and distrust. They may be politically irritable, but they have no political passion. They are a chorus, too afraid to grumble, too hysterical in their applause. In the short run," he concludes, "they follow the panicky way of prestige; in the long run they follow the ways of power."

The potential members of the new-middle class in the student world today divide roughly into two groups. One might be called the "managerial types." They are going to school to learn how to "get ahead." They will learn to write, speak, organize and plan. Write what? Anything. Speak about what? Anything. Organize whom? Irrelevant. But whatever it be they will have the "skills." They are a confident and talented generation. But their talent and sophistication is limited to their own private lives and skills. They want to lead the good life; they are disinterested in culture, rarely read, and are incurious about the world around them.

Most of them look to the world of industry and business for jobs. But the same kind of social animal exists in the so-called world of politics—i.e. the government or political science major at college or graduate school. Their goal is to learn how to manipulate, govern and "go places" in the political hierarchy—that "neutral" mechanism the State.

The phenomenon is strikingly described by Daniel Seligman of *Fortune* magazine in a study of the character of a group of 25-year olds entering the ranks of management ("The Confident Twenty-Five Year Olds," *Fortune*, February, 1955). "What is it like," he asks, "to grow up into a world that offers almost absolute political insecurity—yet at the same time start off with a comfortable salary?"

Seligman's findings are interesting and provide a striking picture of the dilemma of our society and its impact upon this vast group of the "new middle class." Unintentionally, perhaps, Seligman poses a vital question in a pertinent manner, something quite rare in contemporary America.

Despite the fact that they were born in a depression, reared during a war, and reached manhood in the midst of the cold war, these 25-year olds, interviewed by Seligman, were cheer-

ful and sanguine. They did not remember the depression, and felt that "their type" of person was not seriously hurt by it. For the future they expect high salaries (\$15,000 and up), plentiful opportunity, and security to boot.

They expect to lead the "good life"—a suburbia custom-built home, two cars, a maid, two to four children, country club membership, and a sailboat. And that is it. They are intelligent and sophisticated, but non-intellectual. In general, says Seligman, "they are incurious about life." Their drives, their sophistication and their intelligence is reserved for only one object: "to get ahead" in a personal sense.

It is not strange then that Seligman found them incredibly ignorant about the world around them. These future "leaders" of our business world "know nothing about current events," and are even less interested. If they are unfrightened about the future, they are equally unconcerned and unknowing about it. And they have a firm objection to becoming interested. "It's silly to get steamed up about politics," is the typical attitude. They are, thank God, says Seligman, all "middle of the roaders" politically (which means between McCarthy and Stevenson—the two "extremes"). They are not going to make much political trouble for the U.S. in the years ahead," Seligman notes reassuringly.

But even Seligman, who is after all a realistic and sophisticated proponent of American capitalism, is a bit troubled about this. For this so-called "middle-road philosophy" which seems to appeal to so many of these "bright young men" is based, he fears, not so much on its actual content "as on the fact that it provides a logical cover for the absence of political opinions." They tend to be suspicious of *any* ideology, and are in the middle merely because "they feel the position is innocuous—and fashionable."

Mask of Normality

As a group, groans the author, "their political thoughts tend to be vague, uninformed and platitudinous." This political myopia may be a real danger, warns Seligman in conclusion, because America is not in for as rosy a future as these leading lights expect. Even their own personal futures are not likely to materialize as fruitfully as they seem to imagine—there simply aren't that many \$15,000-and-up jobs available!

This picture of the contented managerial type should sound familiar. He is around every campus and in every management-training program. He has chosen one way out of the dilemma posed by Seligman. For the political insecurity of America in 1956 is too hopeless for most to face, and they are anesthetized into believing they escape it by climbing into the mundane struggle for personal betterment.

And how easy! It begins for these young men with a good solid job at \$5-6,000 a year, a pleasant home and agreeable companions. It necessitates cutting off all "thinking about the world," but that was never a much-appreciated habit anyway, and they are determined not to make a point of practicing it. They have no visions, no ideals, no scope. They are nearsighted, self-centered, decadent and bankrupt—yet, in that "healthy" sort of way which our prosperity permits.

The Seligmans mourn it. They would like instead a dynamic, creative and ideologically oriented class of conservative youth who will take their places in the crusade to "Save Free Enterprise." They sense that this group of nincompoops is totally unprepared and unwilling to take on that job. And they are a bit frightened about how these young men will react when they find out that even their nearsighted personal goals are not so easily and cheerfully attained.

But this dilemma, so well posed by Seligman, is in a nutshell the dilemma of capitalism today: how to create a dynamic capitalist class.

Capitalism survives in America in a prosperous and relatively stable state. Nowhere else in the world *can* there conceivably exist a group of young people who might be *enthusiastic* about capitalism. Nowhere but in America. Yet the prosperity and stability has not produced it. For an ideology of hope cannot be built upon the quicksand of a war economy, creeping totalitarianism, cold war and a groping for the maintenance of the status quo.

European capitalists, having long ago recognized this, have for some years now given up the search for an ideology. They concern themselves with two things: making quick profits and living well as long as they can. America scolds them for their lack of ideological commitment to a driving, competitive capitalism. But the French bourgeoisie, for example, know that the society they symbolize is dependent today not on their efforts or ingenuity, but upon the ability of America to hold her part of the world together through a combination of force, economic aid, bluster and wishful thinking. They understand that the society they believe in and profited from is a doomed one—no matter whether in months, years or decades.

Americans, and especially the personable college graduates, do not understand this consciously. And how can they? They see around them a hitherto unknown prosperity—they see homes, good jobs, automobiles, TV sets, etc. Yet unconsciously they must face this fact in one way or another.

Because the moment they attempt to go beyond the appreciation of their good fortune and develop a perspective, an "ideology" for the future, they begin to sense this phenomena that all the rest of the world is aware of. They begin to sense their futility, their instability and their bankruptcy. They sense that there is no long-range perspective that they can even pretend to aim at in the direction of "saving capitalism."

And yet their immediate life experience does not lead them to rebel—how rebel when the only potentially dynamic force—the American labor movement—lies quiescent and unsure? How rebel when rebellion brings neither prestige, power nor money? So they do what is easiest—they take the money and the status and put political blinders over their eyes and minds. America is rich enough to provide this retreat.

Bright Young Men

And it is rich enough to provide still another, somewhat different retreat: a retreat for those who are too sensitive perhaps, too ideological perhaps, too concerned with using their minds as a tool, to fall whole-hog into the managerial scramble. This other is a retreat which is open for the intellectual.

This is the second major type on the campus—the bright academically oriented student. A good description of his mental processes is found in an article written by Robert Wilson for the Social Science Research Council (*Items*, September 1954). This study traces the intellectual development of a group of undergraduate students in an effort to discover more about their motivations, incentives and goals. And while doing so it casts a light upon their reaction to this same modern dilemma.

The students sampled, according to Wilson, were juniors in college, with average grades of B-plus to A-minus (in contrast to Seligman's sample, whose grades were considerably inferior), and oriented primarily toward the social sciences. Half were the children of managerial or professional parents and another third the offspring of small businessmen.

Most of these young students found their first "energizing force," their first impetus for serious study," in the desire to "change the world for the better and 'solve' social problems." Wilson suggests, on the basis of this, "that a reformist zeal is essential to keep a neophyte interested long enough for him to be intrigued by a more scientific attraction."

The pattern, he suggests, goes something like this:

The young boy becomes aware of human ills, is discouraged or outraged by the irrational and self-defeating attitudes of both the individual and society, is stirred by a sense of injustice and is "infected with an 'alarm bell in the night' ideology—something must be done about these things right away." So he studies for answers. At first he is optimistic, but then, as time passes, he becomes sophisticated, sees that social change is complicated, that our knowledge of human and social behavior is scarce and inexact, and decides that "the serious scholarly pursuit of verified knowledge is more far-reaching in its consequences than most of the 'activist' alternatives." Finally he becomes disenchanted with the idea of reform altogether, and enchanted with the idea of scientific seeking of truth. And thus at last [hurrah!] his motivation to learn has been transformed from "a pragmatic zest in the interest of rebuilding the universe to a commitment to science for science's sake."

The validity of this description of a certain type of student development is considerable, even if it is overly generalized. For the description is more or less accurate depending upon the nature and climate of the rest of society. When American political life is more significant and propelling, a considerable section of these "scientists" will drift out of this pattern, as they did during the 1930's and again after World War II.

The Sophistication of Detachment

That is, it is not a general law of life, even of intellectual life, but rather it is an accurate description of the "intelligentsia" today. Likewise, by the way, the extent of the "reforming zeal" which exists today among the young "neophytes" is questionable. For our dull, monotonous and uninspired political climate affects the adolescent too. And in view of Dr. Wilson's thesis one wonders where the new supply of social scientists will come from.

But despite these objections it is a relatively accurate picture of a whole segment of the "best" of today's college students. And what stands out in this study above all else is the prejudice of the Social Science Research Council and Dr. Wilson—prejudices which are at the heart of the problem.

For there is no doubt on which side they stand, as between reform or scientific detachment. While they give one the name of naivete and one sophistication, this is not really the issue. For they never pose the very obvious third alternative—"sophisticated reform," or, in other words, sophisticated political activity.

They do not suggest, in fact, the possibility of a harmony between the activities of the "scientist" who observes and the "activist" who is involved. They do not even suggest that such detachment is, *in the long run*, a prerequisite for sophisticated action. Rather activity *per se* is defined by the author as naive, and detachment *per se* as sophisticated.

The youth who is described and applauded in this study first sidetracks activity in the interest of more academic study for the purpose of becoming a more effective and less naive political. But soon, lo and behold, he loses all interest in action and becomes interested in his studies for their own sweet sake.

The end result? You can find this sophisticated student in any classroom and in every youth organization and in every

campus coffee shop. He is the one who never signs petitions—"must examine this question more thoroughly first," "things are much more complex than you people realize," etc.; he never gets indignant, he has no political passion—"let us not get so excited, after all there must be a reason for it," etc.

In short, while he is willing to discuss the complexities, and even sometimes willing to learn, he constitutionally never knows enough to act with impulsion, indignation and fervor. He never "concludes"—even temporarily. "Nothing is simple, everything is complex" becomes a formula for rationalizing inactivity, for never becoming involved too deeply in anything but himself.

Yet in the end, strangely, he makes the most naive and simple political choices (for, like it or not, everyone in some way or other makes "choices"). And this is probably not so strange after all. For it is essentially a naive idea to start with, the idea that "science" can be a substitute for values. Science is a tool, and when it is divorced from means, actions and goals it becomes, for all its jargon, a static and sterile one.

Retreat Into Objectivity

To discuss techniques and "ideas" in the context of nothing is totally irrelevant, as irrelevant as to discuss means as if they were things in themselves. Techniques have an impact when put in a certain context, just as means have an impact. Techniques of "helping people adapt," "lessening social tension," etc., are not somehow devoid of social content. They have, for all their wish-washy neutral flavor, a political, theoretical and moral meaning. For example, adjustment to society is a seemingly neutral concept. Getting along is after all a fine thing no matter how you look at it. But nevertheless it does depend upon what one is getting along with. Somehow the assumption that one can compare adjustment in tribal clans, Tibetan monasteries and modern industrial societies—be they Stalinist, capitalist or socialist, is nonsensical.

The retreat into "objectivity" or assumed objectivity has a further consequence, aside from its failure to produce very useful social science. It has an effect also on the personalities of its victims. It stultifies the mind and it isolates the human being from part of himself. One cannot document this with statistics, because the feeling that man was intended to be more than a vegetating cabbage or an easily molded hunk of clay may be a bias, a personal whim, a psychological quirk.

But just as we consider it symptomatic of personal illness when an individual seeks to avoid his own inner dilemmas by seeking out immediate pleasures, so it is a social illness when so many individuals escape from facing the inner dilemmas of their society. We have not reached the stage in history when politics can be considered a luxury. It is far more crucial than ever.

Thus we have on the one hand the growing ranks of "business school" types who shun "pure or basic" research, and choose instead the road of activity in the world of self-advancement. And on the other hand there are those who shut themselves up in the world of "pure or basic" research and shun the concept of activity.

While they sound like opposites they have much in common. For each begins by divorcing values and goals from his framework of action. Each begins by shunning the concept of social responsibility. Each ends by distrusting social change and distrusting the bringers of social change—the working class, mankind, "the people."

And these American youths will get no genuine and meaningful political ideology from any amount of preaching by

the Seligmans, or by such as Sidney Hook, or Peter Viereck (see *Conservatism Revisited*) or Clarence Randall (see *A Creed for Free Enterprise*). The best that their type can produce is a kind of muddled lesser-evilmism and do-goodism. The worst is the hypocritical, cynical political manipulator.

Of course none of this is new. We have had careerists in management and government before. We have had the ivory tower scientist since the beginning of time. What is new is rather the absence of any other type of intellectualism.

Part of it can be explained on the basis of the changes in our industrial society. For we have never before been able to make so much use of this type of intellectual. A large mass intelligentsia is a new phenomenon in itself. Modern industrialism needs technicians. It desperately needs researchers, organizers, planners and "idea men." The small entrepreneur did not and could not hire a staff of economists, personnel men, time-study experts, industrial relations experts, training directors, etc. The new industrial firm can, does and must.

Another factor in this trend, affecting more particularly the generation of the nineteen-thirties, is the phenomenon of Stalinism and the consequent disillusionment with political action which had turned out to be such tragic fraud.

But there is a third, overriding reason. It was summed up by Seligman's question quoted above: "What is it like to grow up into a world that offers almost absolute political insecurity—yet at the same time starts one off with a comfortable salary?"

Insecurity But No Rebellion

The generation of which we speak was born in the depression, schooled during the war, and reached manhood in the midst of the Cold War. The modern generation faces the fact that no one today, certainly no one that society considers politically relevant or "sane") has an answer. It is not merely that there is an absence of "sure" answers or dogmatic certainties, but there is an absence of even speculative answers. The best that is hoped for is "time," . . . which will somehow work miracles.

Political insecurity of this sort can cause rebellion and restlessness. But it is the second part of the Seligman question which accounts for the strange absence of rebellion. For this political insecurity occurs within the framework of unprecedented economic prosperity.

While the intellectual is disturbed when he tries to examine the perspectives of his society, he nevertheless has a job, home and TV set in the present. Because he is an intellectual he is capable of abstracting and predicting, but in the world of today this talent when applied to politics is a frustrating and unrewarding one. Because since the intellectual obtains his power and status only through his identification with some other social force, what use can he make of his recognition of society's political paralysis? What social force can he tie his kite to that will permit him to think? He soon discovers that not only does the economy provide him with a lucrative alternative to creativity, but it is the only alternative which enables him to avoid isolation and the seeming impotence which goes with it.

The uncomfortable state of political anxiety is therefore resolved by the grand retreat—a retreat which appears to the outside world like the "silence" of the silent generation. It all begins by the necessary divorcing of all concepts of values from the "real" world. A job is a job, research is research, science is science, and methodology is methodology. What passion is in us we reserve for "do-it-yourself" projects, gardening, hi-fi, the family and getting analyzed. Which is not to condemn any of these, but merely to suggest that this complete with-

drawal and absorption with oneself is a symptom of a very profound social sickness.

Yet to point all this out is not to solve the dilemma. For just as the individual avoids facing his emotional problems because he cannot see an alternative, and lacks the self-confidence to give up the old rationalizations and escapes for the more certain uncertainties, so society avoids its problems until it feels more capable of finding alternatives. And while some might prefer even a passionate defense of American foreign policy and capitalism to the present passivity, it is not surprising that it is not forthcoming. The average student today is surprised by the existence of the dissenter, even intrigued, but he is just as often uninterested and unprepared to defend his orthodoxy against this dissent. He really does not care much one way or the other. After all, he is prone to say, the world is complex, far too complex to think about or argue about, and certainly too complex to get excited over.

The Choice

Today, the clear-sighted and sensitive individual who decides to maintain personal dignity must begin by throwing overboard the dominant values and perspectives of the world around him; he must be willing to face the fact that the society which offers him so relatively much today is a society without a future—a society living on the bones of others—a society sick and diseased. He must face the fact, that amazing fact, that the future belongs to either socialism or Stalinism, and that in reality he is every day choosing between these two.

We live in an Alice-in-Wonderland world, for this fact—that the future lies between totalitarian collectivism and democratic socialism—sounds unreal and irrelevant in the intellectual fantasia which has been created in America by the spokesmen of the "old world."

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The Passion of George Orwell

— The Critics' Myth vs. Reality

WHEN A WRITER is both popular and a non-conformist, the only way out for orthodox critics is misinterpretation. Thus, the fate of George Orwell. In the United States where his reputation rests primarily on two books, *Animal Farm* and *1984* (in which he stressed his horror of Stalinism and totalitarian tendencies in all modern societies), this task of fitting him into a pattern has been fairly easy. One can read reams about Orwell and never once become aware of the fact that this man was a revolutionist and a socialist.

There is the Orwell of liberal orthodoxy: George Orwell, Liberal. And the Orwell of Stalinist orthodoxy: George Orwell, Fascist. There is even an Orwell for the ultra-radical: George Orwell, Social Patriot. And yet, Orwell's socialism is one of the essential facts about him. It weaves throughout his work, it can be said to be his unifying theme, it is what his life is about. And probably the best way to make the point is not to present Orwell from the vantage of one more orthodoxy; but rather to consider his work, to let him speak for himself.

From Imperial Police to Pariahdom

As a young man, Orwell, like many other good middle-class Englishmen after World War I, went to the colonies, to serve in the police force in Burma. He learned about imperialism, not from secondary source books, but in his personal life under a scorching Burmese sun. The impact of the experience comes through in his *Burmese Days*. Riddled with burning hatred—its satirical touch is aimed indiscriminately at everyone and everything—the novel's emotional conclusion is saved from hysteria only by the intensity of its bitterness.

In a way, *Burmese Days* is a failure as a novel. Although it has been called second only to Forster's *Passage to India* among the books dealing with the Far East, its structure is so poor that an earthquake must rumble at the right moment so that continuity can be maintained. And yet a fierce verisimilitude pervades the work: there is U Po Kyin, the fat Burmese magistrate who manipulates everyone, even his British masters, only to succumb to fate by dying before he can build a pagoda; there is the pathetic polo-playing officer; and above all there is the descriptions of the natural landscape of Burma, its hills, its birds.

Dominating the novel is Orwell's consciousness of the gulf between himself and the people—the guilt of the colonial policeman. His hero, Flory, can resolve the experience only by suicide. Orwell himself fled back to Europe in 1927.

A natural reaction followed. He sought to escape from the imperial police by diving down to the very depths of bourgeois society. With a typical Orwellian touch, he went so deep that he went past the workers. He found himself among the down and outs, the beggars, the drunkards, the dispossessed. And as he had learned of colonialism through experience, he taught himself the lesson of bourgeois society in his very life; he lived in the gloomy lower world of the pariahs. He learned that sex was a function of social position when women passed him by because of his clothes; he found that all the abstractions about value—a better life, friendship, freedom—were meaningless to the man starving.

Orwell recorded this experience in his *Down and Out in Paris and London*. The note of hysteria, so present in *Burmese Days*, has passed. One finishes the book with a warm feeling of solidarity with the oppressed among whom Orwell lived. One remembers the description of the *plongeur*, deep underground in a Parisian restaurant, washing dishes at a furious pace while two hundred clean patrons eat their leisurely meal upstairs. Or the English hoboos taunting the priest during his sermon for the first time, because they received their meal before the services instead of after.

In the Orwell of *Down and Out*, the man has found his conscience; he is the political moralist thundering against the decadence of the society in which he finds himself.

The Spanish Civil War

Orwell had still not arrived at a political position. He was anti-capitalist, to be sure; he possessed a vague, Stalinoid vocabulary; but that was about all. It was not until Spain that he was to learn his politics, and learn them in his typical fashion, in the midst of a tremendous struggle. *Homage to Catalonia* is, of course, the record of this development in Orwell's life.

Almost by accident, Orwell found himself with the POUM in Spain. (The POUM is the Workers Party of Marxist Unification, a revolutionary socialist, anti-Stalinist grouping.) But first, before the political lesson, came the actual impression of the revolution. Orwell caught its essence in a million details: the waiters, for instance, refused to be tipped. Equality reigned. And instead of chaos, Orwell found a voluntary discipline, the discipline of a revolutionary people, organizing to struggle against the fascist enemy.

Orwell went to the front to fight against the fascists; perhaps to die for the reality of the revolution which he had found. Then the rumors began: the revolution was being betrayed behind its own lines. Orwell went back to Barcelona and discovered the top hats, the fine ladies with their dogs, the tip—that symbol of the relationship between master and servant—restored. Men who had gone out to fight for the revolution were being shot by their "comrades," the Stalinists.

Thus Orwell learned the reality of Stalinism: that it was opposing the anarchists, the Trotskyists and the revolutionary socialists, not because they were counter-revolutionary, but because they were too revolutionary; indeed, because they were revolutionary at all. Spain, the Stalinists argued, must be defended as a bourgeois republic with a popular front government. The fascists can be defeated, not with socialism, but with a return to the old order. On the other hand Orwell, along with all the other revolutionists, realized that the only practical way to carry on the struggle was through a revolutionary fight (a leaf not usually to be found in the book of George Orwell, Liberal). The Stalinists won the "argument" and the revolution was defeated.

From his experience in the Spanish civil war on, Orwell's major political concern was to attack totalitarianism. In England, when it was still quite unpopular to utter the truth about Stalinism, he spoke out, bluntly, candidly, from the depths of what he saw happen in Spain. Burma had broken

him from the old order; the pariahs of Paris and London had brought him indignation and solidarity; the tragedy of Spain had given a political content to the moral development.

When World War II came, Orwell enlisted in the Home Guards, attempted to get into the regular army, and finally had to settle for a job at BBC propagandizing for the war-effort. It is here that the radical orthodoxy is affronted; it is here that we meet, George Orwell, Just Another Social Patriot. And there is no doubt of it, Orwell did support the war (a position which I do not agree with); but the crucial question in viewing this question as well as his life as a whole is not the simple fact, but the how of it, its peculiar quality.

Early in 1941, Orwell wrote three essays, collectively known as *The Lion and the Unicorn* (which have never been published in the United States). It was in this work that he set forth his position on the war. First he pointed out that capitalism is through:

What this war has demonstrated is that private capitalism—that is, an economic system in which land, factories, mines and transport are owned privately and operated solely for profit *does not work*. It cannot deliver the goods.

Does this mean that we must abandon the historical stage to fascism and to Stalinism? No! Orwell rebels against such an idea. We must fight against these new barbarisms, he argued, but fight against them in the only way that can succeed: as socialist nations.

This is how he put it:

The fact that we are at war has turned Socialism from a textbook word into a realizable policy. Because the time has come when one can predict the future in terms of an 'either-or.' Either we must turn this war into a revolutionary war . . . or we lose it, and much more besides. . . . But to preserve is always to extend. The choice before us is not so much between victory and defeat as between revolution and apathy.

The facts have proved Orwell wrong. World War II was not fought on a revolutionary basis; its result was not socialism; and its chief beneficiary was that Stalinism which Orwell detested so roundly. There is certainly no point in glossing over this part of Orwell's career—to do so would be to commit the very error of the various ideologists who suppress what is embarrassing in Orwell. And yet, it is important to note the qualifications which Orwell attached to his own position. He was not supporting the old order, for he retained the belief, which he had won in Spain, that "to preserve is always to extend," that in the modern world only a revolutionary, socialist struggle is capable of meeting the crisis of our times.

This in turn suggests another aspect of Orwell's personality which cannot be ignored. His commitment to socialism was politicized by his experience in Spain; yet it retained a certain untheoretical cast, it was marked more by its sustained quality of moral indignation than by its analytic efforts. Thus, in *The Lion and the Unicorn*, one finds errors about Marxism which can only be attributed to ignorance (e.g. that Marx had disregarded the shop-keepers and white-collar workers).

In some cases, this lack of a theoretical, one might even say a political, approach had important practical consequences. The moral indignation could not substitute itself for analysis and the result was that Orwell, even while stating his case in revolutionary language, often embraced a non-revolutionary position. An example of this is his attitude toward World War II. Again, Orwell refused party affiliation because of his particular belief in the necessity of the artist to be free and unbounded by party discipline, which is a strange attitude in a man to whom commitment meant so much.

These aspects of Orwell cannot be ignored. But at the same time they must not be allowed to obscure his one per-

sistent, great theme: a belief in the people, a conviction that they must make their own revolution, a rejection of elitism of any kind. This was the fundamental insight which emerged from his experience in Burma, London, Paris, and Spain; and this is *the* difficult truth for the mid-twentieth century.

When one turns to Orwell's critics, the first thing that becomes apparent is that all of them are engaged in some kind of a distortion, or taming, of his basic theme.

The Stalinists come through as one would expect. In Milton Howard's "Orwell or O'Casey?" (*Masses and Mainstream*, Jan. 1955), O'Casey is lauded, of course, as a champion of peace, freedom and the peoples' republics, while Orwell is that sinister, sniveling monster, the decadent intellectual Fascist. For Howard, Orwell lives in "dread of any social advance by the class of 'swine' in the factories." Translated, this means that Orwell was opposed to the Stalinist bureaucracy which exploits its workers and peasants.

On the other hand, a social democrat has some difficulty in dealing with Orwell. Here is a statement by Jon Beavan (from *World Review*, June 1950):

Orwell's quest for the worker was a failure. He never attained a deep understanding of the ordinary English wage-earner and his aspirations; and he never appreciated, therefore, the virtue of the Labor Party and the Trade Union Movement which fulfill so successfully the English wage-earner's needs . . . He was concerned with the mental and moral health of the entire Left. He was a Lollard of social democracy, a preacher of the pure faith at war with the corruption and hypocrisy of the Church.

Clearly there is a considerable amount of truth in this observation. But what it misses, I think, is that Orwell went much further than being "a Lollard of social democracy." His "pure faith" pushed him every time to the conclusion that what was needed was a truly revolutionary transformation of society. He found that justice and liberty were the absolute basis of socialism, but that they had "been buried beneath layer after layer of doctrinaire priggishness, party squabbles and half-baked 'progressivism.' . . . Justice and liberty! These are the words that have got to ring like a bugle across the world." This is, to be sure, not theory; it is preaching, yet its message shatters the tradition-bound limits of social democracy; it is a revolutionary preaching.

The Innocent Child

This moral quality in Orwell's conviction has opened him up to interpretation by still another political tendency, the liberals. Their reasoning goes something like this: honesty, decency, and morality are the great liberal virtues; Orwell was honest, decent, and moral; therefore, Orwell was a liberal. This point of view is stated in Lawrence Brander's *George Orwell* (1954). It is refracted in George Woodcock's (who is not a liberal) statement that Orwell was "an intellectual survivor of the free fighting Liberals of the nineteenth century" (in *World Review*, April 1950). And Isaac Rosenfeld called him "a radical in politics and a conservative in feeling."

Another element in this theory of Orwell as Liberal is the picture of Orwell as Child. Writer after writer stresses an element of innocence in his personality. Thus, Rosenfeld: "The decency which Orwell had linked, at one level, with the Socialist movement, in which he saw its only chance of surviving, now seems to belong (in *Coming Up for Air*) entirely to the laissez-faire days preceding the First World War. . . ."

This image of the childish Orwell was recently carried to its logical conclusion, where it was even stripped of all political meaning, or rather, where the politics became a function of the child. Anthony West, in his *New Yorker* review of *Keep*

the *Aspidistra Fying* explains Orwell almost completely in terms of a neurotic reaction to family and early education. This is how he accounts for a man who saw imperialism in Burma, the lower depths of Paris and London, the betrayal of the Spanish Revolution, World War II, etc.: "... bad as the state of the world during Orwell's lifetime ... [it did not justify] a picture of a future order in which all children are treacherous and cruel, all women dangerous, and all men helpless unless cruel and conscienceless. Only the existence of a hidden wound can account for such a remorseless pessimism." That's that. To return now to the liberal and Orwell.

In order to deal with the liberal's childish innocent Orwell, let us turn to an essay which he wrote after World War II, that is, after the time when he is supposed by Lionel Trilling to have lost his simplicity, his naïveté. The piece *Second Thoughts on James Burnham*, is an analysis of James Burnham's book, *The Managerial Revolution*. In it, Orwell is certainly stating a mature attitude. Some of the things which he says are quite open to criticism, yet the essential point of the article is one which absolutely refutes the image of Orwell as a Liberal From Another Age.

In his book, Burnham had argued that the "managerial society" was the thing of the future. Writing in 1940, he saw Nazism, fascism, Stalinism, the New Deal, etc., as examples of a single tendency toward bureaucratic states. The first point that Orwell makes against him is that he had made the "intellectual's mistake," that he sees the "present as the future." The insight is a telling one. It is based on a perception of the intellectual's tendency to generalize an immediate situation into an element in Universal Necessity. But then Orwell goes on to an even more basic analysis.

First, he admits that "Burnham has been more right than wrong about the present and the immediate past. For quite fifty years the general drift has been towards oligarchy." But need this be an irresistible tendency into the future? Orwell probes Burnham's reasons for thinking so. He finds that Burnham's conviction rests on two propositions: "politics is essentially the same in all ages; political behaviour is different from other kinds of behaviour." Under the second point, that political behavior is different from other kinds of behavior, Orwell lists this thought implicit in Burnham's argument: "Political activity, therefore is a special kind of behavior, characterized by its complete unscrupulousness, and occurring only among small groups of the population ... The great mass of the people ... will always be unpolitical. ..."

Then Orwell ties this in with his first observation, that Burnham thinks "politics is essentially the same in all ages." Burnham, he argues, bases himself on an analysis of pre-industrial societies in which class divisions and a minority elite were inevitable and even progressive. He then goes on, "But since the arrival of the machine the whole pattern has altered. The justification for class distinctions, if there is any justification, is no longer the same, because there is no mechanical reason why the average human being should continue to be a drudge ... As for the claim that 'human nature,' or 'inexorable laws' of this and that, make Socialism impossible, it is simply a projection of the past into the future."

He concludes his analysis with a section entitled, "The Future Is Open." He says: "The huge invincible, everlasting slave empire of which Burnham appears to dream will not be established, will not endure, because slavery is no longer a stable basis for human society." By doing so, he not only provides us with a refutation of the picture of George Orwell as the Liberal, he also offers an insight into his critics. The refutation is obvious: Orwell, in 1946, was still passionately

convinced of the actual ability of the people to take their destiny in their own hands and to create a socialist society. He refused the elitist kind of pessimism which Burnham (and many other intellectuals today) had fallen into as a result of the catastrophic events of the twentieth century.

Orwell's description of the "intellectuals' mistake" applies to his very critics. For what the liberals have done is indeed to project their feelings about the present, not only into the future (the desertion from socialism), but into the past as well (where they invest George Orwell with their own point of view). Using Orwell's own notion, one would locate the emergence of this particular picture of Orwell in the general feeling of pessimism and conservatism which pervades our culture today, and not in Orwell's own writing.

Orwell and Pessimism

This point is crucial. For some have argued that Orwell's choice of subject matter in *Animal Farm* and *1984* symbolizes abandonment of socialism, a belief that all collectivism must become bureaucratic and totalitarian, that democratic collectivism is impossible. Placed in the context of his essays on Burnham (written after *Animal Farm* and in the same period as *1984*), it should become clear that Orwell was here dealing with a specifically socialist concern of his—his belief that all elitism, all totalitarianisms, must be opposed for socialism to triumph. In fact, in order to dispell all doubts, Orwell wrote shortly before his death in 1950: "My novel '1984' is not intended as an attack on socialism, or on the British Labor Party, but as a show-up of the perversions to which a centralized economy is liable. ... I do not believe that the kind of society I describe necessarily will arrive, but I believe that something resembling it could arrive." As to the choice of subject matter, I think that it was determined (1) by the need to vividly portray totalitarian society, and (2) by the fact that so many intellectuals had either gone over to totalitarianism, calling it socialism, or had developed an almost completely pessimistic attitude before it, like Burnham. The grimness of *1984* shows that Orwell had approached the limits of pessimism under the impact of Stalinism. His moral fibre, however, prevented him from crossing this boundary into the land of the despairing ex-radical.

There are many, many criticisms which a socialist could make of Orwell's specifically political writings and some of his political positions. Yet today this is not the immediate problem. What must be done now is to rescue Orwell from his critics—from the liberals, the disenchanted, the Stalinists—and to let him speak for himself. And when he does, the voice one hears is that of an uncompromizing revolutionary in the very best sense of the word. There is, to be sure, the note of pessimism, of tragedy, even of nostalgia, but these are within the context of an abiding conviction that the people can, and must, make a socialist revolution.

Orwell has given us a Swiftian irony, a fantastic range—from a brilliant imitation of Trotsky's style in *1984* to the telling of an absorbing story on the sexual habits of the toad—and, above all, a sense, a feeling, of the injustice of exploitation, capitalist or Stalinist. Given this basic and fundamental vision, the one way out which Orwell saw, however imperfectly, was always the way of socialism. From Burma through the nightmare of the Second World War and the emergence of the Cold War, this thought never once left him.

MEL STACK

Mel Stack is a member of the E. V. Debs Society at Columbia University.

Attorney General's List and Civil Liberties

— Replies to an ANVIL Questionnaire

THE EDITORS OF ANVIL AND STUDENT PARTISAN have from time to time tried to get the opinions of a representative cross section of American political figures, intellectuals, and labor leaders on topics of current interest. With the United States Attorney-General's so-called "subversive list" the major weapon in the hands of those who are, in our opinion, endangering the civil liberties of the American people, we sent the following letter to fifty prominent Americans:

In the recent past, there have arisen a number of criticisms of the "excesses" committed by various agencies, persons and legislative committees in the name of security. The criticisms have ranged from that of the *New York Times* on the question of passport denials to those of former Senator Cain on Congressional investigations and the overextended use of the Attorney-General's subversive list. Indeed, most discussion on the security question (of which there is little enough) has revolved around the Attorney-General's list—drawn up by the Truman Administration in 1947—and its application in ever wider domains.

The editors of ANVIL AND STUDENT PARTISAN are interested in securing an expression of opinion from persons who represent a wide range of general social and political viewpoints, toward the issues of the "subversive list." To this end we have framed the following questions which may be answered by a single "yes" or "no." If you do not feel that such a brief response adequately covers your attitude, you are invited to expand one or all of your answers by explaining them. We ask, however, that you try to keep the total number of words under five hundred. The editors of ANVIL AND STUDENT PARTISAN give their assurance that all replies received will be published regardless of whether or not they are in conformity with their own views.

We, therefore, submit to you the following questions for your answers and/or comments:

1. Do you think that the Attorney-General's list should be used as a criterion for hiring in:

- A. Sensitive government employment?
- B. Non-sensitive government employment?
- C. Private employment?

2. Do you think the Attorney-General's list has been a danger to civil liberties?

3. Do you think that the Attorney-General's list is necessary for the security of the United States?

4. Do you think that organizations should have been listed without a hearing or continue to remain on the list without being given one?

5. Are you in favor of the abolition of the Attorney-General's list?

We received the following replies to this questionnaire:

ROGER BALDWIN (Founder of the American Civil Liberties Union):

- 1. No.
- 2. Yes.
- 3. No.
- 4. No.
- 5. Yes.

Senator Cain says the same—he's your best reliance.

MICHAEL HARRINGTON (National Chairman of the Young Socialist League):

1. I'm opposed to using the list in any way, whether it be for determining employment in sensitive government jobs, non-sensitive ones, or for private work. First of all, the list is arbitrary, the result of an executive fiat: no organization on it has yet had a complete hearing, and one must be sanguine about the fairness of a hearing which the Justice Department will give when it concerns an injustice which the Justice Department has perpetrated. Secondly, use of the list inevitably breeds the assumption that organizations are homogenous, that all members are the same kind of members, that the simple fact of belonging is somehow evidence of a crime. And thirdly (perhaps most importantly), the list is one more giant step away from the notion of the overt act. It is in its very essence based on a crazy conspiracy theory which makes no distinction between the legitimate activities of the Communist Party and whatever connection that Party has with the Russian espionage apparatus—and which then goes on to equate the Communist Party, defined *purely* in conspiracy terms, with all varieties of radical (usually, anti-Stalinist) dissent.

2. The List is probably one of the most dangerous single threats to freedom in America. It is not simply used by the Government; its arbitrariness and its menacing assumptions have become the rule in defense industry and even in totally non-sensitive industries like the movies.

The List has also been used in order to violate academic freedom; that is, student organizations have been barred from campus, harassed, or reported to the FBI, on the basis of their inclusion on the list. And then teachers have, of course, been persecuted on the same basis. The Attorney-General's List is the Adam's Apple of unfreedom in the witchhunt.

3. I don't see what the List can have to do with legitimate notions of security. No Government is obliged to hire spies, but the List, as pointed out above, confuses espionage and politics, and by doing so, it is actually a detriment to security. Herbert Philbrick, the FBI informer, once reported that the CP was delighted with McCarthy because his buck-shot technique shielded the real Party member by hitting all kinds of non-Party people. The same, I think, is true of the List. It creates a chaos, not security.

4. The fact that organizations have been listed—and for nine years now—without a hearing, is a significant indication of how far we have gone toward unfreedom. In thinking about this, it should always be remembered that this was started by Liberals (Truman, Tom Clark, etc.) and that it is thus also a measure of how almost everybody in the United States has capitulated to the spirit of the witch hunt.

5. I don't think it is enough to abolish the list; I think confidence in it has to be destroyed, that it must be rooted out of our society. The Government may decide not to use it officially, but then it will still remain in the top drawer of personnel officials throughout the nation. No, it has to be destroyed, annihilated, and this can only be done if the people are brought to a realization of how arbitrary and anti-libertarian it is.

MURRAY KEMPTON (columnist for the New York Post):

On your questionnaire:

1—No.

2—I don't know what the phrase civil liberties means, but I think it has visited no little malignity on great numbers of people.

3—No.

4—Of course not.

5—Yes.

These answers are highly qualified, and are perhaps a little stronger than I really feel. In theory, I think the government should be concerned with Communist espionage in sensitive government employment, and, once you're scared enough, I don't know what constitutes non-sensitive employment. But I don't really believe that the atomic energy commission is considering the employment of any of the sort of people who belong on the Attorney-General's list. The Eastland Committee report on the Communist conspiracy is very enlightening in this respect: it lists 30 people as incessant Communist fellow travelers on the basis of their membership in great numbers of outfits on the Attorney-General's list. That probably indicates they are fools; but reading the list I wouldn't think of any of them as potential saboteurs.

My answer to (4) is qualified chiefly because I am ready to believe that most of the organizations on the list belong there—once you concede the Justice Department's right to compile such a list—and would be "convicted" in any trial. The injustice, in most cases, is the blacklist itself. I think it's more decent for a government to follow certain procedures, but I don't think they make much difference. One of the worst traits of us liberals—not you all—is this business of hollering mistaken identity. There isn't any difference between Jim Kutcher and Saul Wellman—both are revolutionary Marxists (or say they are). We keep stressing the difference in an effort to make Kutcher respectable. To stress the difference is to insult Kutcher who is a proud enemy of the state. So am I and so are you. (4) implies mistaken identity; as I've tried to say, the injustice is the blacklist.

I confess that my own moral position in this matter is not a good one, because I would answer "yes" to 1-A if I thought the Attorney-General's list was a practical test for loyalty and a real screen against spies.

The real trouble with the Attorney-General's list is not what it does in government—it is only a fringe matter there—but the machinery it provides for great private injustices. A man doesn't have to work for the government; I'm sometimes surprised that so many people want to. A man does deserve an honorable discharge from the Army; belonging to an organization on the Attorney-General's list has been cause for denying him one. He does deserve to work in private employment; the Attorney-General's list is used in a number of private industries and is the main prop of Red Channels.

The basic reason for its abolition is a moral one. The government and our society have no right to judge a man by the paper in his life. They must judge him on his own conduct. This is a sort of catechism of a new state church. To clear himself, a man is expected either to disprove membership in any

of these groups or, if he cannot, to denounce them in public. This amounts to a confession of a crime which the criminal does not himself feel is a crime; it is enforced repentance and more damaging to the soul than the sin itself.

You will notice all through this letter that I accept the notion that these things are sins. In most cases they are not. That is the worst thing about the Attorney-General's list: it demands that its critics and its victims prove themselves to be without sin. Max Shachtman, to prove his right to a passport, must testify that he is no Bolshevik. He believes there are rights for Bolsheviks and he says so, but, in this case, he must act as if there weren't. So must I, when I try to get a man cleared for security. I think we have to do these things, but I don't like the government which makes us do them. I do not believe—there go these figments about practicality again—that we could possibly be worse off than we are today if we had foolishly trusted one another over the last ten years.

NORMAN MAILER (author of *The Naked and the Dead*, *The Barbary Shore*, and *Deer Park*):

1. (A) Anyone hired for a "sensitive" government job would be investigated in so many ways that the Attorney-General's list would be nugatory.

(B) No. If the employment is "non-sensitive," I can see no danger from the point of view of the government, and therefore no legitimate need—again from the point of view of the government—to use any criteria of subversion.

(C) No.

2. Yes.

3. I doubt it. All governments employ so many varieties of espionage and counterespionage that something so crude as the Attorney-General's list exists more for its usefulness as an instrument of propaganda.

4. No.

5. By the logic of my first four answers, it is evident I would say yes to this.

REVEREND ABRAHAM J. MUSTE (Chairman of the pacifist Fellowship of Reconciliation.):

1. A. No.

B. No.

C. No.

2. Yes.

3. No.

4. No.

5. Yes.

JOSEPH RAUH (National Chairman of Americans for Democratic Action):

My own feeling as an attorney who has worked in the civil liberties field is that there is no warrant for any such Attorney-General's list. I believe that the people of the United States can tell which organizations are pro-Fascist, pro-Stalinist, pro-Trotskyite and the like without any help from the Government. The misuses of the list were inevitable and I am afraid they will continue for some time to come.

MRS. ELEANOR ROOSEVELT (Member of the National Board of the Americans for Democratic Action):

My answers to your letter are as follows:

1. A—Yes.

B—No.

C—No.

2. Yes, it should be carefully revised periodically.

3. Helpful, if completely accurate and up to date.

4. No.

5. No, see answer to question number 3.

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR. (former National Co-Chairman, Americans for Democratic Action):

This is in response to your letter of January 15th concerning the Attorney-General's list of subversive organizations. Rather than answer your questions seriatim, let me make some general comments. The Attorney-General's list originated not in 1947 but in 1941 as a means of providing government agencies with a check list of Nazi and Communist organizations. Considering the indisputable fact that Nazi and Communist agents were seeking to penetrate the government, the compilation of such a list for purposes of informal guidance seemed to me a sensible administrative procedure. Nor do I recall complaints against this list as administered by Attorney-General Biddle. The error, in my judgement, lay in the transformation of the list under the loyalty order of 1947 from a rule-of-thumb administrative guide to a document with quasi-statutory authority. While I strongly hold the view that people with a superior loyalty to another government have no business working for our own, the evidence of disloyalty provided by association with organizations on the Attorney-General's list seems to me so fragmentary and inconclusive, and the possibilities for misconstruction and error so great, that the list in its present form does not seem to me to contribute to the weeding out of disloyal persons. At the same time, it seems quite evident that the whole technique of "subversive listing" has become a genuine danger to American traditions of voluntary association.

P.S. Congratulations on a bright and interesting magazine.

MAX SHACHTMAN (National Chairman of the Independent Socialist League):

I think the best way to answer your questions is by a general statement which will cover them all.

The Attorney-General's list of so-called subversive organizations has already been sufficiently indicted by labor, fraternal and political organizations, and by courts as well. In my own successful passport case against the State Department, the Court of Appeals judges, in rendering their decision, clearly demonstrated that the list was self-serving and denied due process to organizations listed and individuals suffering thereunder.

Moreover, it held, as some lower court judges had already done, that the Attorney-General's list had no legal standing in courts of law. That does not mean that judges do not recognize and accept its existence. Most do and grant it a validity it does not have. But the reasons for this have more to do with politics generally than with legal tenets.

Readers may remember that the listing originated with the Truman Administration, but no basic change in its use has occurred under Eisenhower. Originally drawn as an index for government employment, the list now has a universal application. None of the organizations listed were ever notified of the intended listing, nor were they ever given hearings. No means of opportunity for challenging it existed.

The means and opportunity for challenge granted by the present Administration create the greatest difficulty for an organization to do so and puts the burden of proof, not on the Attorney-General, but on the organization so listed.

In the case of the Independent Socialist League, it has taken seven years of unrelenting effort to get a hearing. That was only the first setp. The hearing broke off at its start. It is now almost a year later and still the hearing hasn't resumed.

Most of my answers to your questions are already indicated. Firstly, I do not believe that the Attorney-General's list contributed anything to the "security of the United States." The very thought that such a list could catch spies and strengthen the security of the country is a joke all over the world. It was drawn initially as an unthinking, anti-democratic measure to neutralize criticism of the Administration. It is a typical prosecutor-lawyer-politician device.

It is as unnecessary as it is evil. Unnecessary because it cannot serve even the purpose for which the Democratic Administration supposedly erected it; and evil because it has served to undermine democratic rights and due process in the land. It has given rise to nationwide administrative abuse of organizations and individuals, prosecutions of all kinds without proof, and worst of all, a variety of punitive actions based on the mere fact of listing, which in itself was an evasion of due process.

I am not in favor of any kind of list. But life being what it is, certainly no organization should be placed on such a list without a hearing—not just a star chamber, administrative hearing, but one in which witnesses are produced, subject to cross examination, and evidence presented in the open that can be dealt with. Certainly not a hearing based on the faceless informer and evidence that cannot be divulged.

Above all, the Attorney-General's list should be abolished.

ROWLAND WATTS (National Secretary, Workers Defense League):

I hope that you will get widespread helpful answers to your inquiries concerning the use of the Attorney-General's list of subversive organizations. While it would be easy for me to go through your questions, "yes" and "no," I do not think that is sufficient answer. However, if you choose, you are welcome to fill in my "yes" and "no's" from this general statement. In my opinion the Attorney-General's list, as compiled and used, is clearly a danger to civil liberties and a violation of the United States Constitution. In addition, it and the Executive Order 10450 which authorizes it is a violation of Public Law 733, the authority upon which it is purportedly based. I believe that the government has a right and a duty to refuse to employ or continue in employment those who are security risks in the sense that through their actions they make it possible for enemy agents to obtain information which might be vital to the security of the country. Such a right, obviously extends only to security sensitive positions. I do not believe that the Attorney-General's list as constituted, even if it were legally constituted, would be particularly helpful in making a valid determination of a security risk status or potential. Certainly I am in favor of its abolition.

WALTER LIPPMANN (columnist for the New York Herald-Tribune):

I am sorry I haven't studied the question enough to express an opinion.

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A Key To The Labyrinth

—U. S. Foreign Policy in the Cold War

A MERICAN DIPLOMACY in the era of John Foster Dulles is a fair game for ridicule. The succession of absurdities and assinnities of the past three years is over par for any Secretary of State of a comparable tenure in office. We have taken the trip from "liberation" and "unleashing" through "massive retaliation" and "agonizing reappraisals" to the "brink of war," and at each step United States foreign policy has sunk deeper into the quicksand of disaster, retreats and isolation.

Dulles is a symbol of an era forever gone and his the diplomacy of a civilization receding into history. It is not that Dulles is impervious to the world about him when he announces that he is carefully calculating a trip to the "brink of war" in the era of nuclear bombs, but that he is practicing the diplomacy of an other era. It is the old-fashioned power diplomacy where a crisis is "solved" by sending a flotilla of ships to impress the "natives" with a show of strength.

But it would be unfair to the beleaguered Secretary of State to heap on his head all the blame for the pitiful record of his tenure. The inanities of a Dulles, such as his defense of Portuguese imperialism in Indian Goa, confuse the issue, making the task of the Democrats relatively easy in an election year. It is that much easier for them to conceal the fact that the Dulles foreign policy is essentially that of Truman-Acheson.

Parenthetically, this particularly inept quality of Dulles' direction of foreign policy performs a useful function. For Dulles, in his own unique manner, has crystalized all that is wrong with United States foreign policy in such a way that it should not be difficult for even the most ritualistic liberal to see and understand. It is not that Dulles' policies are so different from those of an Adlai Stevenson but rather that they are so similar as to satirically illuminate the gross inadequacies of those of the latter.

The Twentieth Century is the century of the emergence of the great mass of the people onto the stage of world politics as a decisive force. No longer can decisions be made in the great Chancellories which are laws unto themselves, no longer can the fate of mankind be disposed of at Foggy Bottom. The decisions today are being made in lands which only yesterday lifted themselves out of the lethargy of centuries of feudal backwardness and colonialism. The passion for freedom from all alien oppression, the burning desire for national independence and the determination to end the centuries of economic and social stagnation are the revolutionary drives of our time.

Both Stevenson and Dulles acknowledge this. In his book, *A Call to Greatness*, Stevenson writes:

Much of the world in Asia, Africa and the Middle East is on the way—somewhere; it is trying to telescope centuries into decades, trying to catch up with the Western industrial and technological revolutions overnight and under much more difficult circumstances. And they are trying to accomplish this mighty transformation by the methods of consent, not coercion. A policy based just on anti-Communism and military potency is not in the spirit of this great new movement of the Twentieth Century and will win few hearts. The challenge for us is to identify ourselves with this social and human revolution, to encourage, aid and inspire the aspirations of half of mankind for a better life, to guide these aspirations into paths that lead to freedom. To default would be disaster."

Not only does Stevenson say this, but so does Dulles and in words so similar as to border on plagiarism. Throughout

the decade of the cold-war, for that matter, we have heard such declarations from almost all political aspirants. This challenge was posed by liberals in 1948, repeated in 1952 and remains the big challenge in 1956. Through Democratic and Republican Administrations we are told "to identify ourselves with this social and human revolution," although they do not spell out how this is to be brought about.

The problem, then, is not that Stevenson or Dulles do not verbally recognize reality. The real crisis is rather that they do not, *cannot*, put forward a foreign policy sufficiently democratic and revolutionary, a policy which would transform pious phrases into successful action.

The Great Riddle Presented

If we in the United States have not had a Great Debate on foreign policy, then at least we have had the Great Riddle of foreign policy: How is it that the United States which is not a major colonial power, which is more democratic than Russia, and which has spent billions in foreign aid since the end of the war appears before the world as the great imperialist power, the defender of colonialism and the greatest danger to peace; and, at the same time, Russia, a totalitarian power which has enslaved Eastern Europe and looted on a scale unknown in modern history, is able to win the allegiance of millions in Europe and Asia as the defender of peace and advocate of social progress?

On the basis of the commonly known and acknowledged differences, one might easily expect the United States to be dealing Stalinism a series of body blows in one area of the world after another. If this were really a struggle between democracy and totalitarianism, then the United States should be winning the cold war hands down. The United States would have the initiative and Stalinism would be in headlong retreat; the United States would be the rallying point for every democratic movement and Stalinism would be faced with growing isolation. But nothing like this is happening—in fact the reverse is closer to the truth.

All kinds of reasons have been offered as the key to this seemingly labyrinthian puzzle. Some see the disasters of the post-war decade from the extension of the Russian empire to East Europe to the Stalinist victory in China as the dirty work of traitors in the State Department during the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations. Others have a more moderate approach; the State Department was infested, not with out and out traitors, but with appeasers who sold out America's interest just as surely as if they were traitors. (This nuance is the difference between a McCarthy and a Nixon.) Still others, rejecting a devil theory of politics, ascribe a diabolical cleverness to the Stalinists which enables them to lure millions into believing that the United States is imperialist. A variant of this is the assertion that Asians, Africans and many Europeans are politically naive and thus they are perfect targets for clever Russian propaganda. From more liberalistic voices we hear that the reason is to be found in the fact that Russia is totalitarian. Consequently, they argue, Russia can be very flexible and supple in shifting to meet new and changing situations since the Stalinist rulers do not have to answer to the electorate. In the United States, on the other hand, because there is democracy, the process of political change

in foreign policy is necessarily slow.

While the results are very discouraging when seen in this way, the liberal, since he is an optimist by nature and a democrat by definition, insists that there is no inevitable reason for the Dulles-type stewardship. Thus Adlai Stevenson sees the plight of recent years, especially the period since 1953, as the fault of a Secretary of State who talks too much at the wrong time and in the wrong place. The trouble with Dulles and the rest of the crew from Foggy Bottom is that they try to "sell" foreign policy *à la* the sloganeering of Madison Avenue advertisers, and do not "explain" it intellectually to the people of the world.

But what is it that we ought to "explain" and not "sell"? Somehow the crescendo of criticism diminishes at this point. Where, for example, were the vocal critics of the article on "brinkmanship" which appeared in *Life* at the time Dulles was demonstrating this precarious art? According to all available evidence Dulles was carrying out a bipartisan foreign policy with the support of the leading Congressional spokesmen of the Democratic Party. Only a small group of Senators, led by Morse of Oregon and Lehman of New York, voted against the blank check the Senate gave Eisenhower over the Formosa issue in the Spring of 1955. But were they able to answer Senator George's query "What is your alternative to the present policy?" No answer was heard from them.

And a Solution Suggested

The answer to this Great Riddle is to be found not in all this talk of plots, the evils of advertising, and the difficulties of democracy. It is to be found instead in the conflict between two rival social systems—capitalism and Stalinism. The essence of the difference is not that the regimes in the capitalist countries are by and large more democratic than the Stalinist regimes which are totalitarian. Rather it is the fact that capitalism represents the *old* society, the *status quo* in the world today, while Stalinism represents an alternative even if it be a reactionary one. Stalinism speaks the language of social change in areas where social change is the desperate need.

To the millions who have lived under capitalism, known poverty and lived under the oppression of its imperialism, the enemy they see is the enemy who exploited them and who still rules over them in many areas. The Indians and Burmese fought against British imperialism, the Indonesians against Dutch imperialism, and the North Africans still struggle against French imperialism—not Russian imperialism. And when the United States backed up and supplied its imperialist allies or equivocated, the Stalinists, who represent an anti-capitalist force, and hence have no interest in Western imperialism, announced their support to the colonial revolutions.

On the average of every two or three years Congress passes a resolution announcing that the United States is firmly committed to the principles of national independence. These resolutions are usually at pains to point out that we won our independence from colonial status and therefore sympathize with the aspirations of the colonial peoples for independence. With the stroke of a pen, Congress hopes to convince one and all, for the "nth" time, that we are firmly committed *in principle*, to national independence for all people, especially those under the yoke of Stalinist oppression.

The bipartisan supporters of the present foreign policy, including the critics of the particular emphasis Dulles imparts to it, do not demonstrate with deeds their support of national independence. They stand as one for the immediate and complete freedom of the East European satellites from Russian imperialism, as a matter of the fulfillment of democratic

principles. But when it comes to the West's colonies, they appeal to all the practical difficulties ranging from political immaturity to the necessities of the cold war as justification for not supporting immediate independence.

It is all very well to talk of the Kremlin's despotism and the dangers of Chinese Stalinism in Asia and that the triumph of Stalinism means the end to all freedom. But the argument never quite comes home when you tell it to people who are under Western not Russian domination. The military bases springing up throughout the world are not Russian bases. The military alliances which draw the wealth of the countries from constructive to destructive purposes are not Russian alliances, but American ones.

The Capitalist Masquerade

It would seem then that if the essence of the problem is that of a world in revolutionary ferment, then only a foreign policy in accord with these goals can be successful. Only a foreign policy which aids and encourages the revolutionary movements and forces in words *and* deeds will be in step with the times. Any other policy would be a disaster.

It is true that the United States has poured billions of dollars into Asia and Europe, but it was billions to prop and shore up crumbling regimes and decadent societies. Billions went for economic aid but even more went for military purposes, and the billions for economic aid were eventually siphoned off for military expenditures.

The aid has been carefully designed so as not to disturb the existing power system and class relations in the recipient countries. And thus it has had a reactionary and self-defeating rather than progressive and successful impact. Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, commenting on the inadequacy of economic aid without social reform has pointed out that "those who want to stabilize the situation are the most dangerous people in the world. They are the ones most apt to accelerate the trend of that part of the world to Communism."

The onus of being a capitalist power, at least in terms of foreign policy, has not been lost to the Eisenhower Administration either, even if many liberals do not recognize it. Last year the United States Information Service published an official booklet for distribution in France entitled *The American Economy: Beyond Capitalism*. The burden of its message to the French workers according to the *New York Times* of June 26, 1955 is: capitalism in the United States is a thing of the past. "The booklet does not describe what has succeeded capitalism but insists upon the changing character of the American economy and recalls that some have said it was in 'permanent revolution,'" according to the *Times*.

The irony of this pamphlet, published by "the businessman's government," is that while in the United States the virtues of capitalism and free enterprise are extolled and virtually equated with Americanism, in Europe this most representative big business administration has to deny it is capitalist. The symmetry is now complete: Both the United States and Russia don false ideological masks as they seek support in the world; Russia comes dressed as "Socialism" and the United States as "Beyond Capitalism."

But while it is easy to publish a booklet announcing capitalism's demise, in the hope of winning over popular support, it is not possible to change the capitalist politics which alienates the American people from this support, without in reality first destroying capitalism itself. And this, of course, neither Stevenson nor Eisenhower are prepared or capable of doing.

It is now generally recognized that a new phase of the cold war struggle is at hand. The demarcation point, if there

be one, is the Big Three Geneva Conference of last summer. However there were no agreements signed, no problems settled, Germany was not united, disarmament is no more a reality today than a year ago and the satellite captive nations of East Europe still remain under Russian domination. But yet it was a turning point. It signified an end to the direct expansionist Stalinist policies. After the conquest of Eastern Europe, the winning of China and North Vietnam and the military aggression in Korea, the Stalinist world, especially the Russians, want a period of consolidation. Each new adventure incurs greater risks. The Stalinization of South Vietnam or Thailand or even Formosa while it may be desirable from a general consideration is far too risky as against the gains they represent. There is no guarantee that the United States will not embark upon massive retaliation, no guarantee that atomic weapons will not be used. A world war could very easily emerge from a "local incident."

However this does not mean that both the United States and the Russian camp have disengaged from all points of conflict. It is rather that the struggle has taken on new forms. It is extremely unlikely that there will be another Korean adventure or a Berlin blockade. But there will be Russian economic aid or promises of aid to Asia and the Near East.

Remembrances of Things Past

Secretary of State Dulles is not entirely wrong in claiming that it was the United States policy of the past several years which forced the change. But he is certainly overstating whatever case he may have to claim that it represents a victory. This stalemate has been a military deadlock after a decade of an atomic armament race. The armament race continues, the ideological conflict does not cease, but a balance of terror has been reached. The United States can no longer claim a superiority of atomic weapons. What Geneva achieved was a recognition of this atomic stalemate with an inability to solve any of the areas of conflict which remain as germinating points of a future conflict.

Numerous attempts are made to analyze the change in Stalinist tactics in the past year. Speculations are culled from the agricultural crisis, the execution of Beria, the fall of Malenkov, the chatter of conversations at Kremlin cocktail parties, the role of the Army in Russia or the seating arrangement at Communist Party functions. Some are interesting, many more are worthless and nearly all are beside the point. Nothing *fundamental* in Stalinist policy has been changed by the speculations, or by the illusory "democratization" which some purport to see as a result of the Twentieth Party Congress. A sweeping tactical shift has been made to meet the changing events and power relationships in the world as the Russians maneuver to outflank the positions of strength the United States has meticulously set up with its series of military alliances.

As long as the direct challenge of Russian military might or a small shooting war such as Vietnam could be pointed to, a basis was created for solidifying these military alliances. Remove this factor from the foreground, and the cement of the military alliances turns soft, and the conflicts that lie submerged inside of the Western alliance come to the fore. Combine this with Russian offers of economic assistance while the United States struggles to patch up its sagging military alliances and kept regimes and you have the setup for the crisis that extends from one end of the Mediterranean to the other. At no point can it be claimed that the Cypriot or Algerian independence movements are the creation of Moscow's agents, and while the Stalinists have sent arms to Egypt, the

flare-up of the Israeli-Arab hostilities lie far deeper. Thus, given this natural centrifugal tendency inside of the Western Alliance, the Russians have only to announce their sympathy and support for the most divisive forces. The United States can only scurry about trying to patch up each little hole in its systems of alliances, trying to be sympathetic to the Cypriots, Greeks and British at the same time, for example, ending up incurring the hostility of all.

The significance of the Russian offers of economic aid extend far beyond the actual scope of what they may actually ship to Asian or Near Eastern nations. In political terms each Russian ruble of machinery is worth many times the equivalent United States dollar.

The Russians are cleverly presenting their vast economic development of the past thirty-five years as an example of that which is possible for the newly independent nations. Here, they say, is one recently underdeveloped nation offering machinery to those nations which have yet to reach a state of relatively advanced industrialization. This seems an act of open-handed generosity compared to the tight-fisted, military-oriented aid program the United States offers.

Of course, this does not mean that Stalinism has to have a field day pursuing this tactic. Rather it will have success only so long as U.S. aid programs are minimal, tied to military alliance and support the most backward regimes. The irony of this present Russian policy of economic aid and penetration is that the United States claims to have patented it. Time after time, liberals claim that economic aid is the way to stop the advance of communism. And now that the Russians have announced their intention to get into the act, something akin to panic has developed, as U.S. foreign policy drifts aimlessly about searching for new gimmicks.

And Yesterday's Politics

This crisis is bipartisan for beneath the indignant words expressed over Dulles' verbal outrages neither party has any solution, much less a democratic one, to this new Russian maneuver. The Eisenhower Administration has proposed a special aid program which is a joke, about \$100 millions a year. Normally one might expect that the Democrats would propose a much larger sum, would double the Republican bid. Instead, the foreign policy spokesman of the Democratic party, the conservative Senator George, has opposed any long-term program. Other Democrats are more concerned with supersonic speed bombers and the intercontinental ballistic missile as they charge that the security of the United States is being jeopardized by the pennypinching of the businessman's administration.

There is a growing awareness that there must be some kind of change from the military orientation of the past decade. But what kind is the big question. The present policy on economic aid is essentially economic aid for those who enter military alliances or an inducement to join the alliances. John B. Hollister, Administrator for economic aid puts it this way: "The whole starting point of our program is to aid nations to put troops into the field." And this policy, it is admitted requires some economic aid. Out in the field, the *N.Y. Times* of Jan. 24, 1956 reports a speech by U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Horace Hildreth in which he told Pakistan that neutralism does not pay if one wants economic aid from the United States. Hildreth went on to spell this out, citing the fact that of the twenty-one countries from Egypt to Japan, those in military alliance with the U.S. received on a per capita basis twelve times more economic aid than those which have not entered such alliances.

Whatever criticism one may have of our foreign policy, is there a viable alternative to the present policy? Or is the present policy, with all due respect for the talents of the present Secretary of State, the correct reading of America's national interest? If such were the case, then this surely would be a sorry state of affairs, for it would make the present disastrous foreign policy the inevitable and immutable destiny of the American people who would be unable to change it without working against their own interest.

But who is able to state that the interests of the American people demand support to dictatorial regimes such as Franco, Chiang Kai-shek or Syngman Rhee? What is the nature of this interest which necessitates support to the British, French and Portuguese colonialism? And is it the need of the American people to have a foreign policy which has as its prime consideration the cementing of military alliances by trying economic aid to compliance with American military considerations? Or perhaps someone can cite that national interest of the American people which demands that their government pursue a policy which makes the unification of Germany impossible?

Vice President Richard Nixon speaking in New York City on February 14 put the matter rather succinctly: "... there are some even in our own party who might criticize this Administration on the ground that it is too liberal, too progressive. But let us consider the alternative. *The choice is not between the Eisenhower program and something more conservative, but between the Eisenhower program and something far more radical.*" [Italics added.]

"Hang Your Clothes on a Hickory Limb..."

Seen from this perspective, the differences between the Republican Administration and its Democratic critics assume their proper proportion. Given the wide area of agreement, one should not be shocked when Adlai Stevenson says, "I agree that politics should stop at the water's edge..." And when he adds "but surely that should not prevent us from trying to pull Mr. Dulles back to dry ground," it is the politics of a "restraining hand" but not of major political differences.

The present bipartisan policy is not one which has won by default, for it has triumphed against a series of conservative and more reactionary alternatives put forward in the past decade.

The first of these was the "Fortress America" proposal of former President Herbert Hoover, in which he called upon the United States to abandon the attempt to build up alliances and to concentrate on building the Western hemisphere into an "impregnable fortress." It was not that Hoover did not want allies, but outside of Britain he did not believe that the U.S. could find trustworthy allies. This alternative would have been a retreat to isolationism, an abandonment of the rest of the world to the advances of the Stalinist "wave of the future" and the preparation for a last ditch fight. Such a pessimistic and fatalistic course was rejected since it represented more of a defeatist mood rather than a viable alternative.

The other, and far more reactionary, alternative is that of a preventive war. Its main practitioners, General Douglas MacArthur and, to a lesser extent, Senator William Knowland, start from a simple premise: the Third World War is inevitable and they would as soon fight it out now as later since the longer the delay, the greater the strength of the Stalinist bloc. While they have never come out and openly called for a preventive war, their agitation for attacks on the Chinese mainland flows logically from it. Dulles in his article

on "brinkmanship" came close to this point of view, and this is the reason for the horror and revulsion it evoked. This alternative also had to be rejected, since no nation in the era of nuclear weapons can deliberately and consciously set out on the path to atomic war *except* two of the United States's most stalwart allies in Asia, Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee.

Therefore, since the reactionary alternatives have been rejected by the bipartisan majority in American politics and the present policy is a failure, Nixon is correct. The alternative is one "far more radical," that is, a democratic foreign policy.

Democratic Actions vs. Doublespeak

A democratic foreign policy for the United States would mean a sharp break with the bipartisanship we see today. The United States would declare itself in *deeds and words* for the right of self-determination and national independence throughout the world. It would end the present policy of supporting reactionary regimes. For example, we would declare ourselves for the right of the Formosan people to decide for themselves their attitude toward national independence. We would announce our withdrawal of our troops from Germany, calling upon the Russians to do the same, and thereby allowing the Germans to unify their country. Who can reasonably believe that the Russians would begin a military aggression against West Germany under those circumstances, and who would expect that the Russians would give up their East German satellite? The Russian position in Germany would become untenable in these circumstances and would be placed on the political defensive in Europe.

As against the current pitifully small and grudgingly given economic aid programs to the underdeveloped areas, a democratic United States foreign policy would offer a multi-billion economic development fund, *one not tied to military alliances*. We would end all aid to the colonial powers and demand that they grant independence to their remaining colonies. We would encourage all colonial people to seek their freedom and aid them in their struggles.

It is through *actions* such as these that we Americans would "identify ourselves with this social and human revolution" and "encourage, aid and inspire the aspirations of half of mankind for a better life." We will never be able to do it if we just talk about these aspirations and then proceed to follow policies which frustrate them.

The reason is usually offered that the United States can not do all of the things it would like to do because of the danger of Russia's aggressive military and political subversion. But the reason for the Stalinist successes is because they are often able to win the political support of national and revolutionary movements against Western imperialism. Such a democratic program would place Russia and the Stalinist movements on the defensive and do far more than *anything* the United States has done in the last decade to undermine Stalinist imperialism. How would Russia be able to counter such democratic actions? Shout that it is all demagoguery? But who will believe them?

This is the alternative to a bipartisan foreign policy which has produced such a series of defeats and debacles, a foreign policy which has led us to the brink of war time after time. This is the alternative rather than isolationism and preventive war on one side and appeasement on the other.

SAM BOTTONE

Sam Bottone is an editor of ANVIL.

God and the New Criticism at Yale

— The New Conservatism and Cleanth Brooks

WHEN BILL BUCKLEY's new weekly, the *National Review*, first appeared on the newsstands, the Yale community raised a well-groomed eyebrow upon discovering among the ranks of the intellectually unkempt its normally fastidious Professor of English, Mr. Cleanth Brooks. Surprise was followed by shock when the Conservative Society of the Yale Law School announced a series of forums featuring Mr. Brooks and Mr. Buckley, along with such veterans of the radical right as George Sokolsky, Victor Lasky, and E. Merrill Root. Also included—and this may help to explain Mr. Brooks' participation—were two spokesmen of Southern reaction: Eugene Cook, Attorney General of Georgia, and Donald Davidson, Professor of English at Vanderbilt and a leader of Tennessee's pro-segregation forces.

Cleanth Brooks, it should be recalled, is no ordinary Professor of English. He is a distinguished literary critic in his own right, being best known for *Modern Poetry and the Tradition* and *The Well-Wrought Urn*. Along with Robert Penn Warren, his close friend and collaborator, he must certainly be regarded as a Founding Father of the New Criticism. It is not too much to say that the first fruit of their long collaboration, *Understanding Poetry* (1938), revolutionized the teaching of poetry in American universities. Eventually the New Criticism swept its opponents from the field in every important graduate school in the country, leaving no serious student of literature untouched by its influence.

Genesis of Southern Agrarianism

It is all the more interesting, therefore, that Professor Brooks should enter the political arena under such bizarre auspices. The question naturally arises: is his flirtation with the Buckleyites merely a personal aberration, or does it cast some light on the social values which lie behind the New Criticism? Since the question is not essentially poetic, history may prove instructive.

In point of fact, this is not the first time that Cleanth Brooks, or the political tendency which he represents, has entered a united front with the radical right. During the Thirties a group of young Southern writers became the leaders of a Southern Agrarian movement, dedicated to a defense of "traditionalism," combining a critique of modern industrial life with a somewhat embarrassed admiration for the ways of the Old South. The members of this group—Brooks among them—contributed prolifically to the *American Review*, a political journal which has been characterized by Robert Gorham Davis as "openly pro-Franco and pro-fascist."* The story of the *American Review* is worth recounting, both for its own sake and for the light it throws on the historical origins of the New Criticism.

The *American Review*, which appeared during the crucial depression years, 1933-37, was published and edited by Seward Collins, the son of a well-to-do business man. Educated at the Hill School and at Princeton, he was editor of the influential *Bookman* from 1928-33, until the birth of his new project, the *American Review*. In language which might have been written

twenty years later by Bill Buckley, Collins announced the purpose of the new review: "What was intended was a Right-Wing miscellany to undertake the unique task of presenting the opposition to the well-nigh universal liberalism, radicalism, and false conservatism of our organs of opinion." On this basis Collins attracted contributors representing three separate strands of conservative thought: the New Humanism of Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More; the Catholic Distributionism of Hilaire Belloc and G. K. Chesterton; and the quasi-feudal views of the Southern Agrarians.

Reactionary Anti-Capitalism

Centered around Louisiana State and Vanderbilt Universities, the Southern Agrarian movement produced as able a group of writers as ever loaned their pens to the service of reaction. Brooks and Warren, Allen Tate, John Crowe Ransom, Donald Davidson, and John Gould Fletcher imparted to the pages of the *American Review* a tone of high seriousness which makes Bill Buckley's fulminations read like a comic book. The *Sewanee Review* and the *Southern Review* were their literary wing; their social, economic, and political outlet was for a time the *American Review*.

What brought them together with Collins was their common opposition to Plutocracy. On their part, the Southern Agrarians were reviving the historic struggle of the South with Northern capitalism. Collins, who envisioned a society of small property-holders as his ideal, was concerned with the sharpening conflict between the small businessman and his large-scale rivals. A united front was born out of mutual hostility to monopoly capitalism. Of these two reactionary tendencies, the Northern proved to be the more extreme. By 1935, the *American Review* under Collins' leadership was becoming openly pro-Mussolini, and overtones of anti-Semitism were beginning to appear. The Southern Agrarians, who are nothing if not gentlemen, began to back away, but not fast enough, for Tate, Brooks, Davidson, and Robert Penn Warren continued to contribute to the bitter end.

It must be remembered, to be sure, that these were literary men, whose poetic sensibilities were somewhat more developed than their political acumen. Still, the parallel with another kind of fellow-travelling is irresistible. The willing loan of a name (and thus of intellectual prestige), the varying degrees of "innocence" and sophistication, the sudden shrinking from "totalitarian excesses" are all part of a familiar pattern. In any event, to return to the main issue, the list of Southern literati connected with the *American Review* reads like a roster of Important New Critics. Nor was this involvement limited to Southerners—Austin Warren and Yvor Winters, for example, were both frequent contributors. But if this association of the early New Critics with a pro-fascist political periodical is more than mere coincidence, the connection should become apparent from a consideration of the New Criticism itself.

The New Criticism arose during the 1930's as a conscious rebellion against "the current socio-economic-pathologico-Marxist critical method" (Brooks). And in truth it provided a necessary corrective to Marxist and Freudian encroachments

*Robert Gorham Davis, "The New Criticism and the Democratic Tradition," *The American Scholar*, Winter, 1949-50, pp. 9-19.

on the autonomy of literature. It was also a reaction against a sterile historical scholarship which neglected poetry, as one writer puts it, in favor of the poet's breakfast menus. Finally, it was a reaction against Romanticism, being neo-classic in temperament, and attempting to replace effusive "appreciation" with hard-headed analysis. In this respect, it was merely literary criticism in twentieth-century idiom, developed in conjunction with modern literature and designed explicitly to deal with it.

The New Criticism begins, then, with the simple idea that in talking about a poem one ought to talk about the poem. A poem has its own mode of existence, its own kind of being, which cannot be understood by methods appropriate to psychology, or history, or economics. On this basis, the New Criticism distinguishes between the *intrinsic* and *extrinsic* study of literature. Biographical, sociological, or philosophical approaches to literature are essentially extraneous—at worst, evasions, and at best, useful preliminaries. What is fundamental is a discussion of the poem itself, and here the New Criticism has worked out an elaborate method of exegesis, involving close reading and careful textual analysis. For all of this, and much more, the honest opponents of the New Criticism will acknowledge their indebtedness. If the New Critics have accomplished nothing else, they have helped to restore the lost art of reading to a television-reared generation.

Even as the New Criticism reaches the zenith of its influence, the inevitable reaction has begun. Its chief strength has turned out to be its chief limitation, for it is basically a formalist approach to literature, more concerned with the internal consistency of a work of art than with its living relationship to personality, to ideas, or to society. Allen Tate has remarked, "It's not the literary critic's business to seek values in society; his business is to seek them in books." But this retreat into books will not satisfy inquiring minds for long. Younger students of literature, trained in the New Criticism, are already asking, "After the text, what?" They are insisting that words are symbols, which have reference to an object-world beyond the world of language. If this is so, their meaning in the objective world is part of the poet's equipment and responsibility.

So much for theory. In practice, whenever the leading New Critics stray beyond the text into politics, they show an embarrassing proclivity for ultra-conservatism. Yet no one can deduce a man's politics from his espousal of the New Criticism alone. An intermediate step is necessary, for as Allen Tate maintains, "Both politics and the arts must derive their power from a common center of energy." And that vital link is religion. The bridge between Cleanth Brooks and Bill Buckley is Christian orthodoxy.

For many New Critics, religious faith—or to be more precise, some variant of Catholicism—provides a fixed center of ideological gravity. Here the enormous influence of T. S. Eliot on the younger literary intelligentsia must be taken into account. It is no accident, for example, that the lower echelons of the Yale English Department, which is solidly "New Critical" in emphasis, should be staffed with a militant minority of Catholic and Anglo-Catholic converts. The same temperament which admires ritual and ceremony in religion finds formal considerations crucial in art. A poem becomes a liturgical experience, which is somehow never fully satisfying unless it contains an overt Christian symbolism.

Not all New Critics, obviously enough, are political conservatives; nor, for that matter, are all High Churchmen. But wherever this particular brand of religiosity and the New

Criticism are found side by side, one may suspect the syndrome of values described by Robert Gorham Davis:

Over the last two decades, in the journals of the New Criticism, *authority, hierarchy, catholicism, aristocracy, tradition, absolutes, dogma, truths* become related terms of honor, while *liberalism, scientism, individualism, equalitarianism, progress, protestantism, pragmatism, and personality* become related terms of rejection and contempt.

Behind it all lies that passion for order which is characteristic of the conservative temperament. It asserts itself in religion through a High Church; in literature through the New Criticism; and in politics through a desire for stability at any price. A well-known opponent of the New Critics was not far from the crux of the matter when he remarked: "They can't stand Byron, for to read Byron is to look into chaos." Against the chaos of the modern world, the New Critics erect the flimsy barrier of literary formalism, approaching politics as if it were a poem.

Though it antedates the Cold War era, the New Criticism must be regarded as a literary manifestation of the so-called "New Conservatism." In its impact on advanced students of literature, it is analogous to the influence of neo-orthodoxy on students of divinity: it turns their attention from contemporary affairs to more sober thoughts of Original Sin. In theory the New Criticism has a tendency toward passivity in non-literary areas. It thus fosters quietism at the very least, and where it cannot convert, it immobilizes. This retreat from politics, which often foreshadows a marked move to the right, can be successfully opposed only by disclosing the full ideological context in which the New Criticism thrives. In this sense Professor Brooks has done a service by making the political ramifications of this pattern perfectly clear.

BOB BONE

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Civil Rights

(Continued from page 5)

requires is the formation of a new party, a party uncompromised by Southern reaction, a party of American labor. So far, this slogan has been demagogically raised by some liberal politicians (Adam Clayton Powell, for instance) but this is not enough. As part and parcel of the fight for Negro equality—for democracy, in its largest sense, both within the nation and in foreign policy—this party must come into existence.

The moment is now. The ninety years are to come to an end—if. If there is persistent and determined action within the South on the local level; if there is political action on a national scale—the formation of a party of American labor. This is the particular and the general significance of the struggle which is taking place in the South today.

M. H. AND G. R.

To Utopia
In non-euclidian
Geometries of
The spirit, men
Greet each other,
They meet like
Brothers or like
Paralell lines.

—M. H.

The AF of L-CIO Merger

— A Step Forward For American Labor

A GREAT DEAL HAS OCCURRED in the history of the American labor movement since the Congress of Industrial Organizations was formed as the result of a split with the old-line craft unionists of the American Federation of Labor. The CIO set out to organize the great numbers of non-skilled and semi-skilled production workers who never before had been successfully unionized. The major consequence of this turn in the history of the American working class movement was that in the two decades following the formation of the CIO, the ranks of organized labor have increased five-fold; the labor movement was transformed from a relatively narrow representative of the building trades and some other sectors of skilled workers with three or four million members, into a powerful national organization of the great bulk of the industrial working class. In 1956 the trade unions stand fifteen million strong and represent potentially, if not yet in actuality, the most powerful force for social change this country has ever known.

It is apparent that all this could not have been achieved without the split in the labor movement which has now come to an end. The old AFL, dominated by a combination of the business unionism of Samuel Gompers, the conservatism of the aristocracy of highly-skilled workers who attempted to stop or slow down the switch to mass-production, and heavily influenced by gangster elements, was unable to perform the absolutely essential task of the last two decades: the organization of the mass-production workers. Not only did the independence of the CIO enable it to perform this task, but it transformed certain unions within the AFL itself into mass industrial unions. It was this internal change within the AFL which provided part of the impetus for the unification of the two wings of the labor movement.

Taft-Hartley

But this change alone would not have been enough at this point to have led to the creation of a unified and powerful labor organization which is now in the position to advance the interests of the working class. Without the two most important contemporary prongs of the attack of American capitalism on the labor movement, it is doubtful whether this progressive step would have been taken at this point.

The major weapon of this offensive against organized workers was the passage of the Taft-Hartley law and the failure of the labor movement to achieve even minor revisions in the years since this potential union-smashing law was passed. Neither the Truman administration nor the Eisenhower regime differ in this respect. Both the conservative and militant trade union were blocked in many directions by the workings of the law. The cost of endless litigation necessitated by the law has placed a major burden on the unions. Organization has been brought to a virtual standstill, union security damaged, and strikes broken by use of the law. This has been increasingly true as the National Labor Relations Board has come to favor the business interests which figure so prominently in the Eisenhower administration. And if the law has created such difficulties in the midst of the current prosperity, the union leadership is aware of what their movement faces if the country again becomes a victim of depression and unemployment.

The Taft-Hartley Act functions within a certain context. In the South it has been combined with all of the traditional

union-busting measured utilized by business when faced by the threat of unionization. Significant sectors of American industry have moved to the South in search of a low-paid, unorganized source of labor and have resisted with great vigor any attempt to alter the situation. This intensified anti-union offensive has had its repercussions in the North as well, with the union-smashing tactics of the Koehler interests in Wisconsin and the Perfect Circle company in Indiana being dramatic symbols of the lengths to which American industry will still go in an effort to defeat the unions.

And Koehler and Perfect Circle are only extreme examples of the continued and inevitable hostility on the part of American capitalism toward trade-unionism. Even the sectors of American capitalism which pride themselves as being "progressive," in critical situations replaced the gloved hand of their industrial relations departments with the mailed fist of classical strikebreaking. Although Westinghouse's president Price has been hailed by *Time*, *Life* and, *Fortune* as one of the "new capitalists" who understand that unions are part of the "American-way-of-life," Westinghouse has utilized almost every weapon in the books not only to break the long strike but to smash the IUE as well.

Strength in Unity

It was the growing realization on the part of trade-unionists that the rhetoric of the industrial relations departments only masks, but does not alter, the basic pattern of class-relations that gave impetus to the movement for labor unification. To meet the heightened offensive of American capitalism the total strength of the trade union movement is needed. Thus, in the Westinghouse strike, unions which belonged to the old AFL as well as those formerly in the CIO, have pooled their strength and funds to support the IUE.

The partial ossification of sections of the CIO bureaucracy played an important role in creating the situation in which labor unity could occur. The CIO leaders who had been the young militants of the organization drive of the 1930's have become more like their counterparts in the AFL. Increasingly divorced from the life of the rank and file, they become "statesmen of labor" taking on some of the attitudes and values of the "statesmen of industry" with whom they bargain. Only the weakened tradition of an earlier period and the less bureaucratic atmosphere of the CIO prevents them from espousing the simple "bread and butter unionism" of their AFL counterparts.

Despite the partially reactionary causes for unification, it has, nevertheless, created a labor movement powerful enough to achieve its potential as the truly progressive force in American life. And many who fear the power of labor recognized this. Speaker after speaker arose at the unity convention from among the "friends of labor" and counseled the new labor movement to use its strength sparingly, to be moderate, to walk slowly and with humility. The conservative leaders of the new federation sensing its potential for militancy, a force which would unseat them from the throne of power, proclaimed to the assembled unionists and the outside world that, of course, thank God, there is no class struggle in the United States, and that only people with carbuncles could be so dyspeptic as to believe in such a Marxist phenomenon.

But all this was so much window-dressing. When even the more conservative of the leaders of the new federation talked

about the real world and the contemporary problems faced by the labor movement, they talked in class terms, they argued in terms of the need for *labor* to become "more political." The classic case of this contradiction between the rhetoric employed and the politics advocated was the exchange between George Meany, the president of the new federation, and the head of the National Association of Manufacturers.

Meany went from the unity convention to the 60th annual convention of the NAM, meeting at the same time in New York City, in order to proffer the olive branch of peace and the glad-hand of solidarity to the representatives of American capitalism. Less committed to the slogans of class harmony so popular among Meany's compatriots, the minions of capitalism slapped the hand offered in fraternity, demanding instead that the labor federation sign a "code of conduct" which was little more than the terms of "peace" offered by the victor to the vanquished.

And suddenly Meany turned radical. In answer to the attacks of the NAM Meany retorted: "If the NAM philosophy to disfranchise unions is to prevail, then the answer is clear. If we can't act as unions to defend our rights, then there is no answer but to start a labor party." And he repeated this deliberately over a national TV network when questioned by reporters. Not, of course, that he was for a labor party *now*. But if the NAM was so foolish as to force them into it, then "sometime in the future" this step might become necessary.

Labor's Future

The labor movement faces many problems which must be solved before it is really free to move forward. In the first place, it must defeat those forces within the federation which are composed of outright gangster and racketeering elements or who tolerate and foster such elements for less-than-criminal but nevertheless highly dubious reasons. This is the meaning of the fight between Meany and Reuther on the one hand and James R. Hoffa, the racket-connected real power in the Teamsters Union. Hoffa is making a major bid for control by challenging the jurisdiction of the United Automobile Workers and other industrial unions over workers who perform the important work around industrial plants during model changeovers, rebuilding or repairing, by allying with the reactionary officials of the building trade unions. In

attempting to support the International Longshormen's Union, expelled from the AFL for being gangster-controlled, and by taking under his protective wing the independent Stalinist-controlled Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers Union, he has directly challenged the Meaney-Reuther leadership.

In the second place, the AFL-CIO must solidify its opposition to racism. While the national leadership has come out against discrimination and has supported the struggle for Negro rights, Jim Crow unions and Jim Crow practices within union locals are still commonplace. While the labor movement is capable of raising the fight for Negro equality to the level of victory, it must first purge its own ranks of racism.

Still there is much short of this that the labor movement can do which will at least increase its political experience and confidence, which will test the nature of its "friends" in the Democratic Party. It can demand of the Democrats that they adopt and put through a militant civil rights program; it can raise demands in the area of foreign policy which while inadequate from a socialist standpoint will nevertheless be hesitant steps in the right direction; it can demand that a program of social legislation be not merely an addenda to the Democratic platform, but a central focus of its attack.

With these matters out of the way, labor can then turn to the task of that major reconstruction of American society necessary to end the reactionary nature of the present period.

It would be misguided to believe that the Democratic Party can in fact really accomplish even these minimal demands. But for the labor movement to raise them and thereby indicate its independence from the Democratic Party rather than being a group requesting certain favors from the Democrats, will be a step forward.

Such a development will make the power of the united labor movement felt in national politics and will make all other forces and groupings adapt themselves in one way or another to this force. And this experience itself can clearly demonstrate to the American working class and the whole American people that labor is capable of building its own political party, that in fact if its strength is not to be wasted, it must build such a party.

GEORGE POST

George Post is a former member of the ANVIL Editorial board.

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The Crisis of Contemporary Music

— Art and Society in the Modern World

THE POSITION IN OUR SOCIETY of contemporary serious music can hardly be considered a healthy one. The works of modern composers are infrequently performed and even less frequently listened to. The concert repertoire consists almost entirely of the "standard" classics, dating back to previous generations and centuries. Such new music as is performed is generally played but once, and then put aside for years or forever. Still worse, those interested in new music are definitely a minority within that minority of our society who profess a liking for serious music.

This state of affairs is not new; it has persisted for over a generation. Nor are there currently signs of a sweeping change in it, here in America. Something is wrong in the relationship between the musical artist and American society.

Henry Pleasants' recent book, "The Agony of Modern Music,"* deals with this situation—and in radical fashion. He argues that "modern music" is richly deserving of its neglect for it attempts to perpetuate a dead tradition of European music, possessing neither musical nor cultural validity. Its continued existence is due solely to "self-deception by an element of society which refuses to believe that this is true."

Pleasants advances two distinct arguments for these views; a musical argument and a "sociological" one. He claims that his characterization of serious music as "a dead art" can be proven by purely musical considerations. "The hopelessness of the situation," he states, is *technically* demonstrable."

Musical considerations, nevertheless, are not Pleasants' major concern. His case rests entirely on what he considers to be the relationship between music and society.

He takes as his point of departure the crisis described at the beginning of this article—but he apprehends it in peculiarly distorted form. According to Pleasants, the nub of the problem is this: modern serious music is *totally* divorced from society. "The composer of modern music," he writes, "has no audience." Thence he draws the plausible conclusion that modern music is simply a monstrous fraud, perpetrated by a "conspiracy" of composers, performers, and critics, and made possible only through "self-deception" on the part of listeners dreading the scorn of future generations.

The principle trouble with this thesis is that its main proposition is more than slightly ridiculous. There happen to exist, even in this society, a certain number of people with such warped tastes who actually *enjoy* listening to a great deal of modern music.

Pleasants has other arguments as well. In order to demolish the myth that great composers in the past have never had wide appeal, he enumerates the many instances in which then new great music has been able to "excite the enthusiastic participation of the lay listener." From this he proceeds to a colossal *non sequitur*: "all the music which survives in the standard repertoire has met this condition in its own time."

Here is a fine example of a man driven to ignore both logic and fact in order to arrive at a preconceived conclusion. The whole discussion of the success or failure of new music in the past would simply be irrelevant if it did not lead to a proposition of this sort: *All great music enjoyed wide popular success in its own time. No serious music today enjoys, or can enjoy, similar success.* Therefore no great music is being written today. A tradition in which great works can no longer be created is evidently a dead tradition.

The argument dissolves at the first contact with fact. It is unfortunate, but it is true, that many towering masterpieces were quite unsuccessful in their own time, and had to wait long after their creators' death to achieve real popularity. For a few examples, consider "The Passion According to St. Matthew" or the last String Quartets of Beethoven.

The essential point of his thesis, however, cannot be dismissed so easily. What is decisive for him is this: to have a legitimate place in modern, mass society, music must appeal to these masses *could* change if the policy of the Israelis toward these same people would change.

Personal Worth Equals Exchange Value

Pleasants' view of the relationship between music and society is simple, direct, and thoroughly mechanistic. He states that "music is the product of societies rather than of composers." A society produces its music by selecting the music it likes best from the product offered to it by various producers of music, in accordance with the laws of the market. "A society's music is determined, not by what appeals to a government, or to a composer, but by what appeals to society."

The criterion of both social acceptance and cultural validity is *commercial* success. "The only musical fact of real significance is the new music for which there is a *demand*." The market thus becomes the sole arbiter of values, rejecting modern music as it would any inferior commodity. We are here in the presence of a genuinely capitalist theory of aesthetics, conforming strictly to the principles of marginal utility economics in a fashion which ought to delight the NAM.

As a good *American* theory, this one also contains a healthy dose of chauvinism: "Western civilization is now well into its American phase, and its music is the popular music of America." The implications of this merit discussion. We are informed that the new music of "Western civilization" under U.S. hegemony is the product of Tin Pan Alley. By an identical process of reasoning it follows that America has imposed, as the highest representatives of its civilization, the art of the *Saturday Evening Post* covers, the poetry of Edgar Guest and Nick Kenny, and the novels of Spillane and Co. Has Mr. Pleasants considered what it is he is saying about the nature of American society as represented by its culture?

It cannot be denied that in capitalist society music in its concrete forms (scores, recordings, performances) is a commodity, produced for sale on the market. Nor need it be denied that, in this particular case, the market is roughly an accurate reflector of popular taste.

But is the work of art nothing more than a commodity? If, as Pleasants contends, music is nothing more than a stimulus designed to provoke a certain response in its listeners, then it becomes meaningless to discuss the *intrinsic* value of various works or styles. All that counts is its ability to provoke the right response.

But there is no reason to believe that the highest goal of musical creation is to create a momentary pleasure for the listener. Even though it takes the form of a commodity in its concrete manifestations, a work of musical art is qualitatively different from the object designed for consumption.

To begin with, a musical composition is potentially immortal. It has a chance to survive both its creator and its original auditors. Each generation brings to a work of music

considerably different listening habits and expectations; it literally listens with different ears than did the original audience. Thus it must be something inherent in the work, not merely its stimulus-value for immediate pleasure, which permits it to survive though the centuries. There is nothing mysterious about this intrinsic value—it resides in the work's intellectual substance.

It is the essence of music that, as Susanne Langer states, "*music articulates forms which language cannot set forth.*" The ideas which music embodies represent feelings and insights that cannot be reduced to words. Music derives its intellectual value, its close relation to concepts, not by reason of its different academic 'laws' but in virtue of its *revelations*. If it reveals the rationale of feelings, the rhythm and pattern of their rise and decline and intertwining, to our minds, then it is a force in our mental life, our awareness and understanding, and not only our affective experience.

The objective value of a musical composition is determined by the depth, scope, and perceptiveness of its insights into the world of human emotions and by the power and skill with which it expresses these insights in tones.

This is not to suggest that the creation of music takes place independently from society. The composer is, like everyone else, a social being. All influences upon him, and most emphatically including the artistic tradition in which he works, come to him through his social environment. His musical ideas themselves are not divinely inspired; they are the composer's insights into and perceptions of the world of himself and his fellow beings, his social world. And the conditions under which he must live in order to create—how much leisure time he possesses, what privations, if any, he must endure—these are social facts.

The composer, therefore, cannot separate himself from society. However, the work of art itself is more, far more than the sum of the social conditions of its production. Its intrinsic nature as an articulated revaluation is what enables it to transcend the society in which it is created.

What, then, is the actual relationship of music to society? Except in reference to the social influences upon the actual musical composition the question is misleading, since music, as a communication, can never establish any direct relationship to society as a whole, but only to that portion of society which hears it, to its audience. The audience, in turn, is made up of individuals, each of whom approaches the music with a different background, different expectations. A given audience, at a given time, may or may not be able to "understand" what the composer is attempting to articulate.

The degree to which a musical composition is liked or understood the first time it is heard is irrelevant to its intrinsic value. The sole relationship that a musical composition can legitimately be required to establish with its listeners is to become more meaningful, more expressive to them, to have a greater impact upon them as they get to know it better through repeated hearings.

One other aspect of Pleasants' view of the nature of music should be taken up here. He says that music must appeal to the "ordinary mortal"—that it is "the masses" who decide cultural values. Isn't this at least a *democratic* theory of music?

It would be, if music were what he assumes it to be, a meaningless stimulus. But *objective* aesthetic values cannot be determined by a majority vote. Nor can great music be written with the specific purpose of immediately communicating its insights to broad masses, except in those rarest of cases where the social emotions moving both masses and composer are identical.

For a "democrat," Pleasants has a very low opinion of the musical intellect of the ordinary person. He uses the term "laymen" to refer to those whose sole musical capacity is to respond correctly to the stimulus, and who are fooling themselves if they hope to apprehend music on any higher level.

The theory that music is a meaningful communication is far more democratic for it regards the listener as a person capable of intellectual effort, willing to use his ears and mind to comprehend an unfamiliar pattern of sound. Great music, modern or classic, is totally democratic, for it is accessible to all who are willing to make the effort required to grasp it. It is totally devoid of snobbery, since it refuses to adopt a condescending attitude toward its audience.

The Impasse of Tonal Music

Modern music must be evaluated in terms of its own musical content, extra-musical criteria being of no merit. How does modern music stand up under such a specifically musical examination?

The art of music has, for most of the past fifty years, been undergoing a crisis. Its focal point, as Pleasants perceptively demonstrates, is the breakdown of tonality.

Western music, since the time of Monteverdi (*circa* 1600), has been based on the system of "key relationships," that is, of tonalities. Tonality can be described as "a balance of tonal harmonies rendered stable and convincing by the use of a context of such related or leading chords as appear to find their ultimate solution in the desired key..." It is the tension between different keys and the feeling of *resolution* obtained by a return to the original key that provides the structural coherence necessary for the creation of extended forms such as the sonata and symphony.

The evolution of Western music has been a history of the expansion of tonality. In order to achieve wider contrasts, greater excitement, and larger structures, increasingly harsher dissonances (chords containing a high degree of tension) were used, bolder modulations (changes of key) took place.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, the system of tonality had expanded so far as to destroy itself. The introduction of chromatics (non-scale tones) on an equal basis into both melody and harmony had provided music with a wealth of materials beyond the power of the "tonal" system to organize.

Two major solutions have been proposed to this situation. The chromatic scale. This has been labeled "dodecaphonic" One, identified with the late Arnold Schoenberg, abandons tonality and makes systematic use of all twelve notes

The other, identified most closely with the later ("post-Sacre") works of Stravinsky, attempts to fuse modern techniques of harmony, rhythm, and instrumentation with "classical" forms and a basically "tonal" structure. This is generally termed "neo-classical," for obvious reasons.

Other composers have refused to adopt a "system," but have attempted to work out a personal compromise which would enable them to draw on all the resources of music, both "tonal" and "atonal." Much fine music has been written on this basis, especially by composers like Bartok whose personal style relies strongly on "folk-type" melodic material. But whatever success eclecticism is able to achieve in individual instances, it can offer no solution to the evolutionary crisis of western music, the breakdown of tonality.

Pleasants rejects all solutions to the impasse. "The end of tonal harmony," the prophet of doom declares, "spells the end of what we call serious music."

When demonstrating the inadequacy of neo-classicism Pleasants is very effective. He considers it "reactionary," and rightly so. Refusing to accept the evolutionary development which has destroyed tonality, neo-classicism attempts to solve the crisis by retreating to outlived formal models, it tries to base itself on a "tonal" musical language.

It is a doctrine that looks toward the past, not the future, and vainly so. Its fatal contradiction is that it must contain modern, dissonant harmonic material, if it is to avoid the status of mere imitation of "classical" compositions—and there is no reason in the world for anyone to write, perform, or listen to an imitation of Bach, Mozart, or Hayden when the originals are available. But the modern concept of harmony, the inevitable result of three centuries of evolution in the tonal system, is incompatible with tonality.

"The neo-classicists, the neo-romanticists, and all the other neo's," Pleasants writes, "... attempt to reconcile the modern approach to dissonance with the classical concept of tonality. This is possible only on paper, for tonality requires a tonal concept of dissonance, and the composer no longer treats dissonance tonally."

Although Pleasants is able to attack neo-classical music on its own, purely musical grounds, he is unable to do this in regard to "atonal" music. He admits that twelve-tone music represents the logical consequence of the development of tonality, that it is self-consistent, "a language in the sense that those who devised it also employ it, and even seem to understand it."

And if he cannot effectively criticize it on purely technical grounds, his attitude is completely dependent on his basic "sociological" aesthetic theory. Thus, he considers dodecaphonic music as "academic," without popular roots, "producing in the 'average layman' only 'the sensations of the untutored wanderer in a wasteland.'" And if the response of the market is the sole meaningful criteria of aesthetic worth, then, of course, such music is worthless by definition.

There is no question that dodecaphonic music presents a "problem" to the average listener, even though we reject completely Pleasants' "sociological" aesthetics. It is certainly one of the most complicated phenomena in the history of western art, and its idiom is radically different from that to which the listener is accustomed. And this is so because it presents a revolutionary answer to the crisis stemming from the breakdown of tonality. In it, harmony is no longer the basic structural element it was in "tonal" music. It can now be used with complete freedom. The French conductor, critic, and composer, René Liebowitz describes this change as "the invention of harmony for its own sake." Structural unity is maintained by the repetition throughout the work, in constantly varying form, of the tone-row (series of twelve tones) on which the composition is based, and by rhythmic and melodic development through variation and contrapuntal treatment.

Because of this strangeness to the auditor, it requires repeated hearings and a good deal of mental effort to become familiar with a twelve-tone work. Whoever listens to such music infrequently, or superficially, or with a closed mind, has no right to complain that it is "incomprehensible." Sufficient study will render it coherent and emotionally meaningful to the intelligent musical amateur. While twelve-tone composers have produced their share of bad music, they have written much of formal strength and emotional impact.

Pleasants concludes by discussing a different form of music, jazz, for which he makes the modest claim that it "is modern music, and that nothing else is." However, it is difficult to be

certain that he really means "jazz" and not the popular music of Tin Pan Alley, for he has the highest praise for the latter form. He has, it would seem, substituted "jazz" for "Tin Pan Alley" by a transparent sleight of hand. While composed popular music and improvised music are not of the same genre, it is surely possible to understand, if not pardon, Pleasants' embarrassment at having to hold up the Hit Parade as the standard bearer of music progress.

Pleasants' arguments on this score are not to be taken seriously. He has rejected modern "classical" music because the vast majority of people don't like it—but he neglects to mention that jazz is just as much a minority taste as classical music. How many jazz records are to be found on the average juke box; how often is it heard on the disk-jockey radio programs? Is he aware that at present jazz is losing its own (Negro) popular roots (consider the number of white jazzmen)? Or has he listened to modern "progressive jazz" which is acquiring all the most esoteric aspects of modern serious music, including atonality?

Modern serious music, Pleasants to the contrary notwithstanding, is an art in progress. Its idiom of atonality is demonstrably valid on musical grounds, and it has produced many significant works. Its failure to gain social acceptance lies in the nature of society, not in the nature of music.

The Ruling Class and the Artist

In every class society the forms of "serious" artistic creation have been a cultural monopoly of the upper classes, who alone possessed the leisure time necessary to enjoy art, and the financial resources to support the producing artist. *Our capitalist society is no exception to this rule.* The development of media of mass communication, which potentially can alter the situation enormously, has in fact merely served further to corrupt popular taste by appealing, as a matter of commercial necessity, to the 'lowest common denominator.'

The nineteenth century, which saw such an enormous development of music, was also the epoch of the definitive victory and flourishing of capitalism. The bourgeoisie was adventurous and self-confident enough to welcome artistic progress—to accord a warm reception to revolutionary novelties in the opera, from Mozart to Wagner and Verdi, and in the symphony, from Beethoven to Bruckner.

In recent decades, however, the musical revolutionary has been met by bourgeois society with a coldness surpassed only by the fury with which the political revolutionary is attacked. Nevertheless it has proved easier to carry out the musical revolution than the social one. Atonality, as developed by Schoenberg and his followers, resolved the crisis in music and opened the doors to an entire era of musical progress.

The progressive modern composer cannot hope to find wide acceptance in this society. The upper class, which makes up the bulk of the serious music audience, is artistically, as well as socially, reactionary. The working class cannot, for the reasons already mentioned, be expected to like his music.

Modern music will be able to escape from its isolation only through a very sweeping social transformation. The present dominant reactionary attitudes will have to be replaced by an eagerness for artistic progress, an eagerness which will come in the wake of a revolution which will, by abolishing class rule, allow the masses to enter the treasure house of western culture; a revolution which will, for the first time in human history, make possible the development of a truly popular culture.

SHANE MAGE

Shane Mage is a young American composer and critic.

IN REVIEW

The Delicate Tragedian

by Michael Harrington

There is a middle-brow (and therefore dangerous, pervasive) image of Henry James: of the artist as precious, of the mandarin expatriate. It derives itself from the intricacies of James' later style, though one is tempted to assume that many of those who repeat it came miraculously to their knowledge of the later style, i. e. without reading the later novels. Not too long ago, this image was made a polar term by a Time-Life critic who discovered a James' school flourishing among the younger American writers.

The recent re-issue of F. W. Dupee's *Henry James* (Anchor, 95 cents) may do much to shatter this absurd picture of one of America's greatest writers. Dupee's book is not particularly startling, it is certainly not definitive. But it is a workman-like job of biography and careful, sensitive reading of texts. As an introduction to James, one would be hard put to think of a better book.

One of the most important things about Dupee is that he is aware of the complexities of his subject. He rejects the simplistic view of "American" critics like Van Wyck Brooks who saw James' later period as a falling off occasioned by his moving to Europe. He presents the novelist in all of his social context, and with a particular emphasis upon his tragic consciousness. And this is an important accomplishment: to rescue Henry James from the mandarin image, to place him in the perspective which he so richly deserves.

How, for example, do these who deal with James as a precious talent account for the fact that Balzac was an abiding influence in his life, indeed, was the greatest novelist of all times as far as he was concerned? Or that James treated homosexuality with a descriptive brilliance in *The Bostonians*? Or that one of the large novels of his middle period, *The Princess Casamassima*, is concerned with the revolutionary anarchist movement in England and succeeds in doing the theme justice much more than Conrad's attempt at the same subject in *The Secret Agent*?

Indeed, one must begin with James by describing him as a social novelist, taking that term in its largest sense. He is not, to be sure, a naturalist, that is his bias does not run toward treating of the lumpenproletariat or of the workers. But in almost every James' novel, the starting point is a social relationship, the narrative is its transformation. It is this very point which has led some perceptive critics to remark on how the whole—the social relationship revealing the moral problem—dominates the individual parts and characters of a James' novel. One cannot, for instance, read the last sentence of *The Wings of The Dove* without realizing that the entire book, the two volumes of it, were carefully calculated to make a certain climactic impression with the final line.

In addition to this general social aspect of James' writing, there are those cases in which he was social in a stricter sense, in which he approached the immediate multi-class reality of the life of his times. In *The*

Princess Casamassima, for instance, it is not simply that James is treating of the revolutionary movement; it is rather that the city, London, is pervasive, that its moods, seasons and time of day are as much a force in the book as any of its characters. And, to continue with this novel (James' most social in the strict sense), we find a feeling for the workingclass that puts most of the "proletarian" writers to shame. Millicent Hennings is a brilliant portrait of a workingclass woman, and when Hyacinth Robinson describes her we feel that he speaks with James' voice: "She summed up the sociable, humorous, ignorant chatter of the masses, their capacity for offensive and defensive passion, their instinctive perception of their strength the day they should really exercise it. . . ."

Realism has been defined as a fictional method which is not based on a separation of styles and of social orders, which turns to the whole of reality, all social classes of it, and makes this its subject matter (thus, for example, Erich Auerbach in *Mimesis*). In the English tradition, a novelist like Fielding represents the eruption of this consciousness into literature—his prefaces in *Tom Jones* are a classic statement of it. James does not quite fit this definition. His interest is primarily with the middle-class, the aristocracy, the nouveau riche, and *The Princess Casamassima* does not represent his main drift. And yet, strange as it may sound, I think one must put James in the realist tradition. If naturalism meant a narrowing of Balzac's total treatment of society to a prejudice in favor of themes from one area of society, then James is in the line of the other Balzac, the Balzac of the Faubourg Saint Germain, of the new banking rich like the Nucingen, of the Bonapartist aristocracy.

But clearly, it is not necessary to react to the image of James as mandarin by going to the opposite extreme and turning him into an Anglo-American Balzac. His greatest work does not deal with the workingclass or the revolutionary movement, his concern with the play of social classes operates on a different level. There is what Dupee calls his "international theme," all the stories of the meeting of Europe and America, experience and innocence, from *Daisy Miller* to *The Ambassadors*. There are his books which deal with delicate moral problems, like the *Spoils of Poynton*. Above all, there is the intricacy of his meditation, the convoluted sentences, the constant use of the half-said and the unsaid. (Stephen

Spenders' judgement that James is sexless should be mentioned here; it is not that he doesn't treat of sex, but that he does so in muted—and exciting, erotic—undertones.)

But in almost all of James' work the dominating theme is a transformation. In *Aspects of the Novel*, E. M. Forester writes of the "hourglass" structure of *The Ambassadors*: at the beginning, Strether is anti-Paris, Chad caught up in Paris; at the end Chad is somewhat disenchanted with his fling and Strether realizes how important it is to "live." Forester's insight is a useful one, for this kind of a transformation occurs in almost all of James' novels. In *Wings of the Dove*, innocence and experience, Milly and Kate, change places; in the *Princess Casamassima*, aristocracy and revolution, the Princess and Hyacinth, turn in to opposites; even in *Washington Square*, Catherine Sloper has become a person by the end of the book.

It is in this theme of transformation that James' irony—and, in some cases, his tragic vision—emerge most clearly. This is true of what is perhaps his greatest book, *The Wings of the Dove*. There, Kate, experience, decides to use Milly, innocence, the dove. She succeeds in doing this, yet events change all. At the end of the book, Milly is dead, but Kate cannot use what she has gained from this fact. The dove has triumphed, but at the price of life. In all of this, there is a sense of time, of people, of places, that is tragic, even if delicately so.

The point is that James is much more than an intricate style; he is certainly not a mandarin. His finest work has as its donee, its starting point, a social relationship, and we do him an injustice if we slight either term. In other words, his novels are not simply a case of classes, the social of the equation; but neither are they a precious abstraction, a toying with relationships. It is rather that he represents a synthesis of characters, of real people, in a context. In this, he can be linked up with the Balzac he so much admired, not the Balzac in whom the artist is smothered by the historian (James' phrase), but the Balzac in which the work of art takes place within the social insight, the Balzac, say, of *Eugenie Grandet* or *Splendeurs et Miseries*.

One hopes that Dupee's book will be widely read. It may well succeed in rescuing James from the middle-brow image of himself. I hope it will send more readers to his books.

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Student Actions at Two Campuses

An ANVIL Report

The fear of commitment and involvement on the part of most American students, which Debbie Meier discusses at length elsewhere in this issue, is nowhere better demonstrated than by the almost universal silence on most campuses in the face of attacks on academic freedom and student rights. In the recent past students have rarely become involved in struggles for the rights of Stalinists or genuine radicals to teach. Campuses which were centers of mass demonstrations in the nineteen-thirties in the defense of faculty and student rights today see only token action by small numbers against constant inroads on academic freedom. Most student-bodies have remained unmoved even in the defense of their own right to a free and democratic student government and uncensored political clubs. And hardly anywhere do students try to achieve a greater share in the decisions of the college community than they have at present. At best they hold the line.

The editors of ANVIL have attempted to keep in touch with the major American campuses and regrettably have little to report in the way of political activity of any sort in most cases. However, on a small number of campuses slight signs of life have reappeared. We believe our readers will be interested in two of the more important of these signs of a thaw in the icy winter of student political life.

Student Rights at CCNY

On November 22, 1954, the Student-Faculty Committee on Student Affairs of the City College of New York passed a resolution which stipulated that in order to be recognized as legal campus clubs, every club would have to submit a full membership list each semester to the Student Life Department.

This was interpreted by most politically aware students as an attempt to stamp out the last vestiges of campus political life. For, by 1954, the political clubs had almost disappeared from lack of members. By a generous estimate the largest, the Young Republicans, numbered about thirty. (In 1948 there were many times this number in the Stalinist-influenced Young Progressives of America.) In all there were eight political clubs on campus: Students for Democratic Action, the youth affiliate of the liberal Americans for Democratic Action; Political Alternatives Club, composed of socialists and pacifists; the Marxist Discussion Club and Young Progressives of America; Young Liberals; Young Democrats; Young Republicans; and Students for America, the McCarthyite group.

All the clubs, except for the YGOP's and Students for America, objected to the Student-Faculty Committee on Student Affairs ruling—but for the most part in a confused and hesitant fashion. Given their small and isolated position on campus, and given their desire to remain on campus, the liberal clubs tried to compromise with the administration. There was the undercurrent of pessimism: "we can't fight, we're too small and all that will happen is our being thrown

off campus and forgotten about." There were the petty would-be politicians, using a liberal club as a stepping-stone to a future political career, and who naturally played a conservative role. Above all there was the ever-present student apathy.

After much vacillating, bickering, and compromise solutions, the Political Alternatives Club, Young Progressives, and the Marxist Discussion Club refused to hand in any such list; and Students for Democratic Action, while finally submitting to the ruling in order to stay on campus, did so under the strongest possible protest. Still, the administration seemed to be winning an easy victory.

But City College is not a small school in some backward province. It has a tradition of militancy for decades. It has been the scene of many student strikes which have not been entirely forgotten.

A petition against the list signed by over one thousand students led to a student referendum which by a two-to-one vote was in favor of abolishing the ruling. A Political Action Committee was set up, consisting of the heads of the clubs, other student leaders, and faculty members. Its only reason for existence was to repeal the open membership list requirement.

Ironically, along with this increased resistance came a retreat as the clubs claiming the names Marxist and Progressive changed their minds and came back on campus by submitting the required names. But then Students for Democratic Action went off campus and formed an Upper Manhattan Chapter, in the process more than doubling its membership.

With the pressure building up (of course, within the context of continuing apathy), the administration began to grant "concessions." Thus, instead of the particular club being listed with each member's name, under the new system after the list is filed, the students' names appear on a Master List under the heading "Members and Officers of Organizations of a Political or Religious nature." The original lists are kept in a safe in the Student Life office and can be opened only with the unanimous consent of a student-faculty committee of four.

Of courses these tactics of the administration did not hamper the function of the compulsory list, which can only be to frighten students and increase the stultifying atmosphere on campus.

The clubs finally realized the dangers of the lists; when they saw that by being accommodating and complying with the regulation the list would become a permanent feature, they stopped vacillating. Five clubs refused to file for the Spring semester '56, with a statement that the ruling "sorely curtailed political activity and inhibited free expression on the campus."

That is the way the situation stands at present. The fight is not yet over. The administration has many weapons still in its hands, not the least of which is student disinterest. But certainly the increasing militancy of the political clubs is a good sign.

Negro Rights at California

The current struggle for Negro rights has aroused a certain amount of social concern on some campuses although by no means have American students concerned themselves with this fight to the degree that it deserves. The history of activities at the University of California at Berkeley in support of the fight of Autherine Lucy for admission into the University of Alabama and against violent racism, is an interesting case in point.

With the prodding of campus Christian groups, a request was made that the student government, the Associated Students of the University of California Executive Committee, send a telegram to the University of Alabama student body supporting Miss Lucy's right to attend school.

After the usual phony procedure of appointing a sub-committee to further investigate the matter, the ASUC Executive Committee declined to send such a telegram. The student members of the Committee capitulated without a fight to the notoriously reactionary non-student members representing the Administration, who clearly indicated that they did not want the Berkeley students to stir up "trouble" and did not want them to engage in anti-racist activities.

However, the students did not allow the matter to rest so easily. With the support of the Young Democrats, the campus Student Civil Liberties Union, one of the women's co-op dormitories, and other campus groups, a petition was circulated which called upon the ASUC Executive Committee to issue a statement to the student body of the University of Alabama supporting Autherine Lucy's fight against racism in education. This petition obtained 2835 signatures in six days of circulation on and off campus.

As a result of the petition campaign and the resultant campus-wide discussion of the issue, the ASUC Executive Committee by a vote of 9 to 6 reversed its previous stand and sent a letter to the student executive committee of the University of Alabama in support of those efforts "which would put an end to racial segregation in higher education" on their campus.

The success of the petition drive was an important victory for those who have opposed the silence and conformity of the campus. As important as the Lucy case was and is, the response of the students to a petition campaign as such is especially impressive after years of intimidation and apathy. As one editorial commenting on this victory at Berkeley put it: "Petitions are back. And it's about time. For years the room reserved for ASUC Executive Committee has overflowed with nothing but ASUC Executive Committee."

It seems that at least on the issue of civil rights for minorities liberal student support can be effectively mobilized. The struggle now is to widen and deepen the areas of student political concern. Perhaps this issue will be the wedge which will create something like a revival of political life on the campus.

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